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THE ROLE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN DEFINING THE FACULTY
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Academic freedom guarantees college and universityprofessors the right to re-
search, publish, and teach without interferencefrom outside sources. Since the con-
cept is ambiuous, it is not incorporated readily into the employment agreement
between theprofessor andthe employing institution. This Note examines the concept
of academicfreedom by exploring the efect that the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors (A" UP) has had in institutionalizing the concept and by tracing
the role of thejudiciary in applying the concept of academicfreedom to employment
disputes. The Note also examines the role of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) as apossible sourcefor the guarantee of academicfreedom throughfaculty
unionization. Concluding that neither the courts, the NLRB, nor the AA UP have
effectively guaranteed academic freedom, this Note evaluates specfc proposals
designed both to provide securityfor theprofessoriate and to make more comprehen-
sible the rights and obligations of bothparties to the academic employment contract.
INTRODUCTION
THE CONCEPT of academic freedom' plays a central role in
the employment relationship between the college or university
and the professor. This relationship, however, is usually defined
in a form contract which contains only information about the in-
dividual professor's school or department, rank, salary, and tenu-
rial posture2 and nothing regarding the effect of academic
freedom on the employment contract. In an effort to provide
1. See note 23 infra and accompanying text for a generally accepted definition of
academic freedom.
2. Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher Education, 65 IOWA
L. REv. 1119, 1125 (1980). See generally Debicka, Commentary on 'Fridmant The Nature
of a Professorial Contract," in UNIVERSrrIES AND THE LAW 23 (P. Thomas ed. 1975).
The limitations and vagaries inherent in such a form contract have prompted Debicka
to refer to such contracts as "mysterious." Debicka observes:
[I]t [the faculty employment contract] is a most mysterious animal.
Perhaps the first and most mysterious question is that of the terms of this
professorial contract. I looked the other day at my own contract of employment,
a curt document, containing little more than my name, address and position ..
and on the back a few excerpts from the tenure by-law, which tells me, inter alia,
that the University may terminate the appointment of a Faculty Member with
permanent tenure if, "The Board declares publicly that extraordinary financial
exigencies at the University necessitate a reduction in the number of Faculty
Members." Other, however, than this one paper, there is nothing in the nature of
express terms between the university and me. We must, therefore, look ... to
terms incorporated by reference or implied in fact or law. Not all universities
... are so fortunate ... to have a faculty handbook, stating which of its provi-
sions are or are not binding. Some universities have no faculty handbook. ...
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some guidance in determining the rights, duties, and obligations
of the parties in the absence of such contractual details, some form
contracts expressly incorporate the institution's faculty handbook
or other ancillary statements of policy and procedure.3 Where the
form contract makes no express reference to ancillary sources,
however, it is common for various additional sources to be assimi-
lated implicitly into the employment contract.4 The college or
university and the individual professor often differ as to which
supplemental sources to incorporate since this basic determination
materially impacts on the resolution of any dispute.5
One commentator has argued that faculty employment con-
tracts should be as complete and accurately worded as other legal
documents.6 Faculty employment contracts, however, embrace
nebulous conceptual principles such as academic freedom, tenure,
and academic due process7 that are as difficult to define as the
legal standards of "reasonable person" and "good faith." The in-
teraction of these nebulous principles makes academic employ-
ment contracts fundamentally different from other types of
employment contracts.8
Even where supplemental sources are incorporated to aid in
the interpretation of the employment contract, it is difficult to de-
fine and apply the principles of academic freedom, tenure, and
academic due process because they "vary with factual and institu-
In the absence of terms incorporated by reference, we must fall back on the mini-
mal implied terms at common law ....
Even if terms are incorporated into the individual contracts from some other
source, it seems that their protection may become illusory.
Id.
3. Debicka, supra note 2, at 23; Finkin, supra note 2, at 1125.
4. See, eg., Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d
1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 113-56 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the above cited opinions.
5. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1124-25. Professor Finkin describes the rather cavalier
process of bargaining between the university and the prospective employee which usually
culminates with the signing of a form or contract or the receipt of a letter. Another com-
mentator has described the "negotiation" process as follows:
[P]rofessors often lack vital information not only about job offers they consider
and reject but also about the one they actually accept; over one-fourth of the
more than one hundred professors interviewed confessed that they did not know
about such matter such as. . .office facilites, fringe benefits ... promotion pos-
sibilities, and committee responsibilities at the time they signed their contracts.
D. BROWN, THE MOBILE PROFESSORS 56 (1977).
6. Aiken, Legal Liabilities in Higher Education Their Scope and Management, 3 J.C.
& U.L. 121, 236 (1976).
7. Id. at 237.
8. Id.
9
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tional contexts [and] are intensely practical matters [which] negate
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every conceivable situation." 9 This inability to correct the ambi-
guity of employment contracts forces many institutions to state
that the equally nebulous constructs of "fairness and reasonable-
ness" should determine the parameters of academic freedom and
academic due process.' 0 Unfortunately, such imprecise terminol-
ogy only perpetuates the ambiguity already inherent in faculty
employment contracts.
This Note contends that faculty employment contracts which
lack such clarity and precision, coupled with an adverse market
for professorial positions, threaten the fundamental concept of ac-
ademic freedom."I The threat is engendered by permitting college
and university administrators to dismiss faculty personnel for
purely "political" purposes under the guise of a legitimate exercise
of administrative discretion. 2 The resulting chill on academic
freedom, in turn, causes a decrease in both the quantity and quali-
ty of independent scholarly research and teaching in our colleges
and universities.1 3
The Note begins with an historical overview of the role of the
professor in higher education and the development of the concept
of academic freedom." The Note then briefly discusses the for-
mation of the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), the role of that organization in regulating faculty em-
ployment contracts,' 5 and the events which culminated in the pro-
mulgation of the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure (1940 Statement).'6 Because the judiciary
has become increasingly involved in the resolution of academic
contract disputes, the Note also reviews a series of cases which
interpreted the 1940 Statement and other AAUP policy docu-
ments as either reliable sources of custom and usage within the
academic profession 7 or an embodiment of the normative stan-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. A. THOMSON, INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 9 (1974).
12. See notes 285-92 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 175-85 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 22-47 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 48-84 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 113-42 infra and accompanying text.
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dards for resolving faculty contract disputes." The impact of the
extension of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to include faculties of colleges and universities 19
and the subsequent revocation of that jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court is also a subject of the Note.20 Concluding that the AAUP,
the judiciary, and the NLRB have failed to guarantee academic
freedom through their definitions of the faculty employment rela-
tionship, the Note evaluates specific proposals designed to estab-
lish the terms and conditions of faculty employment more
comprehensively and with greater clarity.2"
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom has played a central role in the evolution of
the modem college and university.22 While recognized as an es-
sential right, the concept of academic freedom is not readily de-
fined. The more comprehensive explication of this illusive
concept was published in 1930 by Arthur 0. Lovejoy, the founder
of the AAUP:
Academic freedom is the freedom of a teacher or researcher in
higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the
problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether
through publication or the instruction of students, without in-
terference from political or ecclesiastical authority or from the
administrative officials of the institution in which he is em-
ployed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his
own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to profes-
sional ethics.23
Academic freedom is a "qualified right" which guarantees an
individual scholar limited protection from the retaliatory or re-
tributive action of an employing institution.24 The Lovejoy defini-
tion, in particular, confines this protection to the right of a
qualified scholar to research and publish without interference
from outside sources.25 Notably, the right to academic freedom
18. See notes 143-85 infra and accompanying text
19. See notes 186-237 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 238-92 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 293-313 infra and accompanying text.
22. See generally R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1955).
23. I ENCLYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 384 (1930), quotedin Herberg, supra
note 22, at 1.
24. Herberg, On the Meaning of.Academic Freedom, in ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM 2 (V.
Earle ed. 1971).
25. Id. Professor Herberg notes that the scope of the Lovejoy definition is further
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affords faculty members a protection which is supplemental to the
protections provided by the first amendment. 26 Furthermore, aca-
demic freedom is neither a fundamental human right nor a deri-
vation of natural law.27 Rather, such freedom is an acquired right
which society has granted because of the perceived relationship
between unfettered academic inquiry and social advancement. 28
The american professoriate, however, has not always been the
beneficiary of the protections afforded by academic freedom. The
notion that faculty members should be afforded such freedom
originated in the 18th century when external influences began to
seriously impede the intellectual and technological development
of colleges and universities. 29  The two primary sources of such
interference were the denominational influence of religion30 and
the secular influence of university benefactors.3'
A. The Universi y and the Church
Throughout the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century,
most colleges maintained strong denominational affiliations. In
fact, most institutions required conformity between the personal
religious views of their professors and the religious philosophy of
the institution. 32 The imposition of this religious affiliation re-
limited to include only written and spoken communications in the professor's area of ex-
pertise engaged in during lectures or other classroom activities, professional meetings, or in
journal or book publications. Id.
26. Id. Professor Herberg has argued that because the principle of academic freedom
has been accepted so widely, it sometimes is viewed erroneously as a constitutional right
subsumed within the first amendment. Herberg illustrates the operation of academic free-
dom by suggesting that a professor of meteorology would not be sheltered from penalty or
reprimand if he or she continually lectured to his or her meteorology classes on an unre-
lated topic like sexual ethics. Academic freedom, however, would have protected Darwin's
right to lecture to classes on his theories of evolution. Herberg further notes that while
freedom of speech is protected constitutionally, there is no natural or constitutional right to
membership on a university faculty. Herberg observes: "An academician, as citizen, is of
course protected by the First Amendment, as is any other citizen. Only when acting as an
academician is he protected by the special right to academic freedom." Id.
27. See generally R. KIRK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AN ESSAY IN DEFINITION 4-6
(1977); Earle, Academic Freedom--The Price is Eternal Vigilance by Professors (II), in ON
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 25 (V. Earle ed. 1971).
28. Earle, supra note 27, at 1.
29. Herberg, supra note 24, at I.
30. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical deveopment of the American col-
lege under the auspices of a sponsoring religious institution, see R. HOFSTADTER & W.
METZGER, supra note 22, at 114-85.
3 1. Id. Academic freedom also has been defined as "the principle designed to protect
the teacher from hazards that tend to prevent him from meeting his obligations in the
pursuit of truth." R. KIRK, supra note 27, at 1.
32. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 155. Hofstadter notes that
Vol. 31:608
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quirement created problems in the academic employment rela-
tionship. The institution created an atmosphere in which
professors were viewed as mere pawns in the religio-educational
process. It was more important for the professor to exemplify
"piety and good morals"33 than academic excellence. Conse-
quently, the professoriate was dominated completely by the eccle-
siastically controlled administrative branch of the college whose
actions could be capricious.34 Eventually, this clerical influence
waned, but it was replaced gradually by the special interests of
developing industry.3"
B. The University and Business
As the 18th century progressed, advancements in the natural
sciences contributed to the secularization of college and university
education.3 6 The church's influence began to erode and a new al-
liance arose between the college or university and business inter-
ests. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the growth
of large corporations, wealthy members of the business world be-
gan to support colleges and universities in an unprecedented fash-
ion.37  Concurrently, benefactors began to stipulate the ends to
which their gifts were to be applied. The influence that these cor-
porate benefactors exerted over educational institutions proved to
Yale's bylaws formalized the requirement of "[e]xacting of all incoming officers a public
statement of assent to the Westminister Confession and the ecclesiastical discipline of the
Connecticut Congregational churches as laid down in the Saybrook Platform of 1708." Id.
33. Id. at 153.
34. In response to a discovery that a French professor embraced "unsound doctrines,"
the Harvard Overseers passed the following resolutions, stating that as Overseers they had
the right:
mo Examine into the principles of all those that are employed in the instruction
of the Students of the College upon any Just Suspicion of their holding dangerous
tenents altho no Express Charge be layed in against them .... [A]nd that no
person chosen into such an office shal be accepted or Continued who refuseth
when desired to give Satisfaction to this board as to their principles in religion.
Id. at 157. Notably, the faculty reportedly did not protest the above resolution. Id.
35. See notes 113-39 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of instances where
the actions and beliefs of the modem professor has resulted in questionable action by the
university administration.
36. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 185-201.
37. The largest recorded gift to a college before the Civil War was $50,000. Business
philanthropy in the latter 19th century, however, dwarfed earlier donations in both size and
frequency. Some examples of the business philanthropy of the late 1800's are John D.
Rockefeller's gift of $34 million to the University of Chicago and a $24 million gift by
Leland Stanford to Stanford University. In addition to gifts to specific institutions, large
educational foundations such as the Carnegie Corporation, founded in 1921 with assets of
$151 million, and the General Education Board, founded in 1902 by John D. Rockefeller
with assets of $46 million, also were established. Id. at 413-14.
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be a potent restraint on academic freedom.38
The "trial" of Richard T. Ely, director of the University of
Wisconsin School of Economics, demonstrated how a large donor
could compel a university administration to infringe upon a pro-
fessor's academic freedom. A committee of regents tried Ely for
heretical social and economic writing.39 The specific allegations
of the charge related to Ely's prolabor views.4° Although Ely ulti-
mately prevailed, commentators indicate that the university re-
tained him primarily because of his stature and contribution to the
university's popularity and renown.4'
The increasing dominance of business interests over the col-
lege and university was joined by another more fundamental
change in higher education. In the 1890's, the number of college
and university professors increased by ninety percent. As a result,
the professorial market became saturated. This phenomenon re-
duced the bargaining power of those individuals seeking jobs and
rendered the job security of the employed more tenuous.4 In re-
sponse to this trend, the professoriate began to demand explicit
contractual tenure provisions.
Initially, the award of tenure proved inconsequential. Al-
though isolated judicial opinions forced a college or university to
38. Some of the more outstanding examples of the adverse influence exercised by
business donors is reflected in the following examples: Henry Carter Adams was dismissed
from Cornell University for a prolabor speech; Edward W. Bemis was dismissed from the
University of Chicago in 1895 for espousing antimonopolistic views, only to be viciously
whipsawed by his new employer, Kansas State Agricultural College, in 1899. After his
dismissal from Chicago, Bemis was hired by Kansas State Agricultural College when the
Democrats and Populists gained control of the state legislature in 1896. Bemis subse-
quently was dismissed for his position "on economic questions" when the Republicans
regained control of state government in 1899 and engaged in partisan reprisals against all
faculty members who opposed "sound conservative economics." Bemis wrote to Richard
T. Ely that it was readily apparent that the dismissals were "to prevent the possible devel-
opment among students and in the state at large of a point of view different from that
usually favored by the donors to the private universities and colleges." Id. at 420-25.
39. Id. at 426.
40. Id. Specifically, Ely was accused of entertaining and advising a union delegate in
his home, encouraging workers to strike, threatening to boycott personally a local antiu-
nion firm whose workers were on strike and favoring the closed shop principle. Id.
41. Id. at 432. Not only was Ely "acquitted," but the regents issued a statement en-
dorsing the concept of academic freedom which has been labeled the "Wisconsin Magna
Charta." Id. at 426-27. Edward Bemis, the academic reformer who had been dismissed
from both the University of Chicago and Kansas State Agricultural College made the fol-
lowing observation in a congratulatory letter to Ely: "That was a glorious victory for you,
... I was sorry only that you seemed to show a vigor of denial as to entertaining a walking
delegate or counseling strikers as if either were wrong, instead of under certain circum-
stances a duty." Id. at 434 (emphasis supplied).
42. Id. at 454.
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adhere to tenure rights which had been contractually granted,43
the majority of cases held that the trustees and regents retained
unfettered power to dismiss professors, notwithstanding express
contractual tenure provisions.' In Hartigan v. Board of Regents of
West Virginia University,45 for example, the court held the Board
of Regents' actions to be beyond the purview of the courts. This
holding exemplifies the degree of deference the judiciary has ac-
corded to the actions of trustees and regents. The court opined,
"[I]s the Board of Regents to do as it pleases, without control, er-
roneous as its actions may be? Yes, so far as the courts are con-
cemed." 4  This judicial posture emasculated any protection of
academic freedom offered by tenure provisions and effectively re-
duced the American professor to a pawn of the academic estab-
lishment. 7 This attitude also created an environment which
fostered the development of a professional organization, the
AAUP.
43. See, ag., Kansas State Agricultural College v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 169 (1878) (award
of damages given for the term remaining in a professor's employment contract despite the
existence of a clause in the contract which empowered the board to remove a teacher
"[w]henever the interest of the college shall require"); Butler v. Regents of the Univ., 32
Wis. 124 (1873) (professor at a state university is not a "public officer" in the sense that his
employment by the state would preclude a contract from arising between the professor and
the university).
44. Ward v. Board of Regents of Kan. State Agricultural College, 138 F. 372 (8th Cir.
1905). In Ward, the court, after vainly attempting to distinguish Mudge, held that the
statute which empowered the regents to remove a professor in the interest of the college
could not be used to impose any liability on the school for breach of contract. The court
reasoned that judicial imposition of liability for following a statutorily mandated course of
action essentially would overrule the statute sub silento. The court also cited Gillan v.
Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W. 1042 (1894), for the proposition
that exercise by the regents of their power of dismissal was not a proper area for judicial
intervention.
In Darrow v. Briggs, 261 Mo. 244, 169 S.W. 118 (1914), the court held that the dismissal
of a professor because of his religious preference was proper since the bylaws of the college
provided for dismissal when the trustees determined that such action was in the best inter-
est of the college. The court based its decision on the premise that when parents select a
college for their children, it is desirable for the college to have a religious atmosphere
harmonious with majoritarian religious doctrine in the western hemisphere. Thus, the
court viewed the adherence to a nonwestern religious belief as adequate grounds for dis-
missal. See also Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W. 1042
(1894). In Gil/an, the court not only held that a professor could be removed without a trial,
but also stated that the Board of Regents may remove professors at pleasure, and such
action "cannot be inquired into or questioned by the courts." Id at 13, 58 N.W. at 1044.
45. 49 W. Va. 14, 38 S.E. 698 (1901).
46. Id at 18, 38 S.E. at 700.
47. R. HOFSTADTER & W. MErZGER, supra note 22, at 465-66.
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II. THE AAUP AND THE 1940 STATEMENT
Although American professors were slow to organize,48 the
dominating role which college and university administrations as-
sumed over their professorial employees49 and the stance the insti-
tutions adopted as the "voice of the profession"50 eventually
forced the professors to unite. Moreover, the lack of judicial sup-
port for the professors' claims of legally enforceable contract
rights stimulated organization." In 1915, after inviting leading
academicians at nine institutions to a conference, a group of eight-
een professors at Johns Hopkins University formed the AAUP.
As a result of the conference, invitations to join the national
professional association were sent to virtually every full professor
at well-established institutions; 867 professors, representing 60 in-
stitutions, accepted their invitations.5 2 By 1922, the AAUP
48. Three basic reasons have been offered for the reluctance of the professoriate to
organize:
1) The nature of the work kept the members of the profession separated and out
of contact and made meaningful and continuous communication difficult;
2) Each university tended to develop its own common law and internal dispute
settlement system. There were also professorial associations which created a
type of cast system within the profession by limiting membership to individu-
als who had achieved a certain status such as full professor,
3) Ego-the professoriate was reluctant to get involved in anything that resem-
bled trade unionism and had material gain as its primary objective.
Id. at 469-70.
49. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
50. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 471.
51. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text. In 1913, the watershed was
reached when a professorial committee approached the president of Lafayette College to
investigate a professor's dimissal. Lafayette's president summarily dismissed the commit-
tee's inquiry, stating, "I trust you will pardon me if I say that your committee has no
relation to me personally which would justify my making a personal statement to you with
regard to these matters." In its official report the committee made the following statement:
The attitude thus assumed does not seem to this committee one which can with
propriety be maintained by the officers of any college or university toward the
inquiries of a representative national organization of college and university teach-
ers .... [W]e believe it to be the right of the general body of professors. . . to
know definitely the conditions of the tenure of any professorship... and also
their right. . . to understand unequivocally what measure of freedom of teaching
is guaranteed in any college, and to be informed as to the essential details of any
case in which credal restrictions, other than those to which the college officially
stands committed, are publicly declared by responsible persons to have been im-
posed. No college does well to live unto itself to such a degree that it fails to
recognize that in all such issues the university teaching profession at large has a
legitimate concern.
R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 475-76. It is interesting to note that two
weeks after the adoption of the committee's report, the Lafayette trustees dismissed the
president. Id.
52. The AAUP began by offering membership on a very restrictive basis. The original
constitution provided that only an individual who was "of recognized scholarship or scien-
tific productivity who holds and for ten years has held a position of teaching or research"
[Vol. 31:608
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claimed over 4,000 members from 183 institutions.5 3 As the
AAUP grew, it assumed a bifurcated role-that of codifying and
disseminating accepted principles of academic freedom and that
of investigating violations of those principles. These dual roles
are discussed separately below.
A. The AA UP as a Legislative Body
The AAUP's initial attempt in 1915 to codify the principles of
academic freedom and tenure was a dismal failure.5 4 Ten years
later, the American Council on Education (ACE) successfully
adopted a formal statement of those principles at a conference at-
tended by AAUP representatives.5" This 1925 Statement, how-
ever, was not well received by professional organizations; in fact,
only the AAUP and the American Association of Colleges (AAC)
adopted its principles. 6
The 1925 Statement not only failed to win the approval of pro-
fessional organizations, but it also failed to gain the widespread
approval of college and university administrations.5 7 Many such
administrations failed to adopt the Statement because its policies
were in the form of specific rules which could be incorporated into
an institution's bylaws. This incorporation, however, apparently
would have constituted a violation of the provisions of many insti-
tutions' charters."8 To remedy this problem, the AAUP and the
AAC reconvened in 1938 to formulate a comprehensive policy
statement which would not be embodied in a statement of specific
was eligible for membership. These restrictions gradually were deleted and AAUP mem-
bership is now open to virtually anyone who wishes to join, including members of the
general public. See AAUP CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. a-e, in AAUP, POLIcY DOCUMENTS
AND REPORTS 95 (1977).
53. R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 478.
54. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 480-86 for a brief discus-
sion of the AAUP's 1915 Statement which articulated two principle objectives: the estab-
lishment of definite tenurial rules and the limitation of the trustee's power to dismiss
professors. Id. at 480-8 1.
55. Id. at 486. The 1925 Statement was essentially a combination of the AAUP's 1915
Statement and a similar document issued in 1922 by the American Association of Colleges
(AAC). The latter organization was the administrative counterpart of the AAUP because
its membership was comprised primarily of college and university presidents. The most
notable aspect of the 1925 Statement was that it marked the first cooperative effort between
the AAUP and the AAC. As Professor Metzger states, "A great bridge had been crossed.'
Id. at 486.
56. Id.
57. By 1939, approximately seven boards of trustees in the United States had adopted
the 1925 Statement. Id. at 487.
58. Id. at 486-87.
19811
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rules. After further negotiations and several amendments, the
AAUP and the AAC jointly endorsed the 1940 Statement.5 9
59. The 1940 Statement of Princiles on Academic Freedom and Tenure provides:
The purpose of this statement is to promote public understanding and support
of academic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them
in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher education are conducted for the
common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or
the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for
truth and its free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching
and research. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth.
Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the
rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning. It
carries with it duties correlative with rights.
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) Freedom of teaching and
research and of extramural activities and (2) a sufficient degree of economic se-
curity to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom
and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success of an insti-
tution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.
Academic Freedom
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication
of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties;
but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with
the authorities of the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his sub-
ject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial mat-
ter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because
of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at
the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned pro-
fession, and an officer of an eductional institution. When he speaks or writes as a
citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his spe-
cial position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning
and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his
profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opin-
ions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institu-
tional spokesman.
Academic Tenure
(a) After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers or investigators
should have permanent or continuous tenure, and their service should be termi-
nated only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under
extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.
In the interpretation of this principle it is understood that the following repre-
sents acceptable academic practice:
(1) The precise terms and conditions of every appointment should be stated
in writing and be in the possession of both institution and teacher before the
appointment is consummated.
(2) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or a
higher rank, the probationary period should not exceed seven years, including
within this period full-time service in all institutions of higher education; but sub-
ject to the proviso that when, after a term of probationary service of more than
three years in one or more institutions, a teacher is called to another institution it
may be agreed in writing that his new appointment is for a probationary period of
not more than four years, even though thereby the person's total probationary
period in the academic profession is extended beyond the normal maximum of
seven years. Notice should be given at least one year prior to the expiration of the
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B. The AA UP as an Independent Investigative Agency
The AAUP also serves as an independent agency6" which in-
vestigates infringements on academic freedom and breach of con-
tract complaints.6 ' These investigations are used more to bring
public pressure to bear on institutions than to provide a source of
revenge for misused professors. 2 The AAUP investigations are
noted for their thoroughness63 and represent a potential source for
developing a consistent body of university law. Such legal prece-
dent is unlikely to evolve, however, because the AAUP views each
investigation as a de novo application of the 1940 Statement to
each particular set of facts.' The AAUP defends this practice on
the ground that parties might be unwilling to accept an AAUP
decision if stare decisis is employed.6 5
probationary period if the teacher is not to be continued in service after the expi-
ration of that period.
(3) During the probationary period a teacher should have the academic free-
dom that all other members of the faculty have.
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal for
cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term appointment, should, if
possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing board of
the institution. In all cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused teacher
should be informed before the hearing in writing of the charges against him and
should have the opportunity to be heard in his own defense by all bodies that pass
judgment upon his case. He should be permitted to have with him an adviser of
his own choosing who may act as counsel. There should be a full stenographic
record of the hearing available to the parties concerned. In the hearing of charges
of incompetence the testimony should include that of teachers and other scholars,
either from his own or from other institutions. Teachers on continuous appoint-
ment who are dismissed for reasons not involving moral turpitude should receive
their salaries for at least a year from the date of notification of dismissal whether
or not they are continued in their duties at the institution.
(5) Termination of a continuous appointment because of financial exigency
should be demonstrably bona fide.
AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP, POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 2 (1977) (citations omitted).
60. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1109
(1968).
61. Id. at 1105-06.
62. The AAUP's primary method of public pressure is the maintenance of a censure
list of institutions which have infringed academic freedom. This list is published in the
AAUP Bulletin and other professional journals. It also is made available to placement
offices in colleges and universities around the country. This recordkeeping has proven to
be reasonably effective as most institutions will capitulate to AAUP standards fairly quick-
ly to get their names removed from the list. The average duration of censureship is two to
five years, although one institution has been on the censure list since 1956. Developments in
the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 60, at 1110-11. See also ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE 143-46 (L. Joughin ed. 1967).
63. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 60, at 1110.
64. Id. at 1107.
65. Id.
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The principles contained in the 1940 Statement are general 66
and provide the flexibility necessary to continue to apply the
Statement.67 The generality and vagueness inherent in such a
document, however, necessitates subsequent interpretation.68
Two primary sources supply such interpretation: the application
of the 1940 Statement to disputes which the AAUP has mediated
and the promulgation of official interpretations, most notably the
1970 Interpretive Comments. 69 The 1940 Statement, officially en-
dorsed by over 100 organizations, 70 and its interpretive gloss oc-
cupy a prominent position in disputes involving the reciprocal
rights and obligations of the professor and the university.
C. Interpretive Gloss on the 1940 Statement
The 1940 Statement embodies three principles which the
AAUP has tried to fulfill since the Statement was promulgated.
The first and most critical objective is to provide protection and
guidance for professors by defining the parameters of protected
speech and action.71 Second, the 1940 Statement attempts to pro-
vide guidance for institutional administrators in drafting person-
nel regulations such as faculty handbooks.7u  Finally, the
Statement tries to assist both the professor and the institution in
assessing the propriety of each other's actions.7 3
To add further substance to the admittedly vague guidelines of
the 1940 Statement, the AAUP promulgated additional statements
on such issues as extramural utterances74 and procedural stan-
dards for faculty dismissal hearings.75 These statements and other
reports form a substantive gloss on the general policies outlined in
the 1940 Statement.76 In 1969, apparently in response to a senti-
ment that the 1940 Statement was outdated, the AAUP and the
66. See note 59 supra.
67. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 60, at 1107.
68. Id. at 1106.
69. Id. at 1107.
70. For a list of endorsers, see AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 1 (1977).
71. Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 63, at 1106.
72. Id.
73. Id. For a slightly different view of the objective of AAUP policy statements, see
Brown & Finkin, The Usefulness of AA UP Policy Statements, 59 EDuc. REC. 30 (1978).
74. AAUP, Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances, in AAUP, POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 14 (1977).
75. AAUP, Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, in
AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 8 (1977).
76. All of the major interpretive documents are contained in AAUP, POLICY DOCU-
MENTS AND REPORTS (1977).
Vol. 31:608
DEFINING FACULTY EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
AAC established a joint reevaluation committee. Rather than re-
drafting or recommending textual changes in the Statement-a
task which would have required re-endorsement by those institu-
tions which had previously endorsed the Statement 77 -the com-
mittee footnoted the Statement with "interpretations. ' 78  It is
noteworthy that only the AAUP, and not the AAC, subsequently
endorsed the 1970 Interpretive Comments.79
A major issue, therefore, is how the courts should use the 1940
Statement and the 1970 Interpretive Comments to interpret em-
ployment contracts. Two commentators, Professors Brown and
Finkin, suggest that the 1940 Statement and its interpretive gloss
be used to interpret vague employment contract terms.80 Brown
and Finkin note that courts, in interpreting faculty employment
contracts, often rely on the relevant institution's faculty handbook
and personnel regulations to supply information not contained in
the contracts. 8' When these sources refer to such concepts as "ac-
ademic freedom" and "tenure," however, the courts should ex-
amine the AAUP's Statement and its interpretive gloss to give
these terms meanings consistent with those held by the academic
community.
Brown and Finkin further suggest that when the faculty hand-
book or other personnel regulation explicitly refers to the 1940
Statement, the courts, in interpreting the contract, should consider
the history of the Statement as well as bilateral and unilateral
AAUP interpretations.8 2 The relative weight to be allocated a
specific statement should depend on whether it was the product of
a cooperative, interorganizational effort, like the 1940 Statement,
and whether the document received sufficient support, as evi-
denced by official endorsements. 83 The AAUP contends that
when courts are faced with an academic controversy, the AAUP
policy documents can provide a valuable source of information
77. See note 70 supra.
78. The 1970 Interpretive Comments constitute a valuable source of additional infor-
mation which courts can use when interpreting vague provisions in an academic employ-
ment contract. For the complete text of these interpretations, see AAUP, Academic
Freedom and Tenure, 1940 Statement of Principles and 1970 Interpretive Comments, in
AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 1 (1977).
79. For a chronological listing of all the major AAUP policy documents and the ac-
tion taken on these documents by the AAUP and other organizations, see Furniss, The
Status of'.4 UP Policy," 59 EDUC. REc. 7, 16-18 (1978).
80. Brown & Finkin, supra note 73, at 41.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 42.
1981]
CASE WESTERV RESERVE L,4W REVIEW
and insight for the courts; "[t]o the extent that they reflect a rea-
soned exposition of how the controversy should be resolved, a
court may well be persuaded by them."84
III. THE JUDICIARY AND THE AAUP
The early history of judicial protection of professors' rights in
employment contracts was erratic and discouraging to the individ-
ual professor." In the late 19th century, it was not unusual for a
professor, employed under a contract with a fixed term, to be dis-
missed before the expiration of the term on the premise that the
term contract itself was an invalid attempt to restrict the college or
university governing board's power.86 As recently as 1958, judges
viewed tenure as irrelevant to an institution's decision to employ
and dismiss faculty members.8 7
A possible rationale for the earlier court decisions is that those
cases were decided when tenure plans were novel concepts. 88 Fur-
thermore, few courts at that time understood that the viability of
academic freedom depended almost entirely on the legal enforce-
ability of tenure. Yet, if society is to benefit from unfettered intel-
lectual inquiry,89 faculty members must be secure in both their
positions as professors and their belief that they are free to re-
search and publish without fear of retaliation if such efforts prove
to be unpopular. 90
84. Id.
85. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, supra note 22, at 464-67; Finkin, Toward a
Law of4cademic Status, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 575 (1973). See also note 44 supra.
86. See, e.g., Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W. 1042
(1894). But see Kansas State Agricultural College v. Mudge, 21 Kan. 169 (1878). In
Mudge, the court awarded damages to a professor dismissed in violation of his employ-
ment contract, despite the existence of a contractual clause permitting the board to remove
a professor "whenever the interests of the college shall require." 21 Kan. at 173. In a
subsequent case, a lower Kansas court interpreted the clause in a one-year term contract
permitting early dismissal by vote of the governing board to be limited to removal for good
cause. Board of Educ. v. Cook, 3 Kan. App. 269, 45 P. 119 (1896).
87. See e.g., Posin v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 86 N.W.2d 31 (N.D. 1957); Worzella
v. Board of Regents, 77 S.D. 447, 93 N.W.2d 411 (1958).
88. Professor William Murphy observed that:
[I]n view of the conflict in the earlier authorities, it cannot be said that there is any
settled "law" which makes tenure plans either enforceable or unenforceable. Fur-
thermore, these earlier cases are dubious sources of guidance in any event, since
most of them werb decided in the days before tenure plans came into widespread
use and acceptance, at a time when employer prerogatives in all areas were
largely unlimited, and professors too were considered to be mere hired hands.
Murphy, Educational Freedom in the Courts, 49 AAUP Bull. 309, 312 (1963).
89. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
90. Professor Murphy also has observed:
In this century ... , great importance has been attached to the concept of aca-
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A. The Role of the 1940 Statement
Faculty members in the late 1950's and 1960's experienced an
unprecedented demand for their services.9 As a result, the 1940
Statement gained increasing acceptance among institutions at-
tempting to attract professors to their faculties.92 During this pe-
riod, conflicts between a professor and a college or university
rarely were litigated. The infrequency of such litigation was caus-
ally related to two factors: dismissed professors found it easier to
move to a new institution than to litigate their claims;93 and, his-
torically, the judiciary had been unsympathetic to faculty contract
claims.94
In the early 1970's, institutions of higher education were faced
with a significant decrease in enrollment which resulted in the cur-
tailment of tenure95 and faculty members' mobility. These
changes further increased litigation, particularly where a material
breach of the employment contract was at issue.96 The courts' in-
ability to grasp the novel concept of academic freedom aggravated
the professoriate's situation.97 Thus, this "new depression in
higher education"98 created a "rising sense of insecurity"9 9 which
chilled any exercise of academic freedom approaching the periph-
ery between protected and unprotected behavior.
demic freedom as an essential attribute of a socially useful and intellectually
healthy university community..... The AAUP recognized that professors must
be protected from arbitrary and punitive discharges in order to assure freedom of
research and teaching. Academic tenure has rightly been considered to be the
handmaiden to academic freedom ....
Murphy, supra note 87, at 310.
91. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1121.
92. Professor Finkin observes:
Formal institutional adherence to the 1940 Statement was initially far from uni-
form; but, especially since World War u with the enormous growth of higher
education, the rise in demand for professional training and scientific research, the
elevated prestige of individuals of learning, and the 'massive authority of the law
of supply and demand,' institutions have increasingly come to accommodate these
claims in institutional policy, most frequently by explicit endorsement of the 1940
Statement or by the adoption of policies modeled on it.
Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id.
94. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
95. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1122 n.10.
96. Id. at 1123.
97. Professor Finkin states: [W]hile a considerable body of academic lore developed
around the concepts of academic freedom and tenure, little law on these subjects was de-
clared by the courts, and the law that did result from the judiciary's fitful encounters with
the professoriate did not encourage faculty members routinely to seek relief in the courts.
Id. at 1121-22.
98. See E. CFrr, THE NEw DEPRESsION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (1971).
99. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1122.
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The heightened tendency of professors to litigate their claims
forced courts to interpret the sketchy terms of academic employ-
ment contracts.l" ° To fill the frequent lacunae and give meaning
to "academic freedom" and "tenure," several courts looked to the
custom and usage of these concepts in academia. To define cus-
tom and usage, these judicial bodies looked to the 1940 Statement
and other AAUP policy documents.101
The court's failure to rely on AAUP documents to define an
employment contract often led to unsatisfactory results. In Zim-
merer v. Spencer, 02 for example, the court had to define the con-
tract terms of "academic due process" and "tenure" in reviewing
the dismissal of a professor who had been a faculty member for
six years.103 The court could have drawn significant support from
the 1940 Statement and the 1970 Interpretive Comments since the
college's notice of nonrenewal procedures bore a striking resem-
blance to those procedures advocated by the AAUP. The court,
however, relied on the "unwritten common law" of the college to
reach its decision. 4
Dr. Zimmerer argued that although the college did not have
an explicit tenure system, she was entitled to defacto tenure be-
cause the San Jacinto Junior College Faculty Handbook contained
the statement: "Tenure is expected to be stable."' 0 5 The court
stated that it was necessary to define the term "tenure"'' 6 but that
neither the Faculty Handbook nor the college's brief provided in-
sight into the word's meaning. Abandoning its interpretive efforts,
the court simply asserted that the facts were sufficient to support a
finding that Dr. Zimmerer had a legitimate claim to continued
employment. 10 7 Furthermore, the court, in determining the ap-
propriate scope of relief, noted the college's procedure of award-
ing a one-year terminal contract to those professors whose
employment the college desired to terminate. Since the district
court determined that reinstatement was inappropriate and the
college had adequate cause to terminate Dr. Zimmerer,10 8 the ap-
pellate court awarded her the salary she would have received had
100. See notes 2-13 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 113-39 infra and accompanying text.
102. 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973).
103. Id. at 178.
104. Id. at 177.
105. Id. at 178 (quoting SAN JACINTO JUNIOR COLLEGE, FACULTY HANDBOOK).
106. 485 F.2d at 178.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 179.
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she been awarded a one-year terminal contract.10 9
Although not explicitly stated by the court, it appears that the
college's dismissal notice provision was essentially a verbatim rec-
itation of the AAUP's recommended provision. The 1940 State-
ment requires that one year's notice be given if the professor is not
going to be continued in service at the termination of the proba-
tionary period.110 Furthermore, the 1976 Recommended Institu-
tional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure provide for a
one-year terminal contract or salary for a tenured professor dis-
missed for cause unless "the conduct which justified dismissal in-
volved moral turpitude.""'
The court would have been on firmer ground had it relied on
these policy documents as embodying academic custom and usage
rather than merely asserting that the facts were sufficient to sup-
port a claim for relief. Had the court in Zimmerer taken judicial
notice of the AAUP documents as establishing the reasonable ex-
pectations of the contractual parties, it would have provided solid
precedent and guidance for future decisions; unfortunately, it
failed to do so." 2
Not all courts, however, have failed to utilize AAUP docu-
ments for guidance. One of the most notable examples of a
court's use of the 1940 Statement is Greene v. Howard Univer-
sity. 3 In Greene, a group of faculty members and students cre-
ated several disturbances on the university's campus. To prevent
further disruptions, the university sent a letter to the involved
faculty members informing them that their appointments would
109. Id.
110. AAUP, Academic Freedom and Tenure, 1940 Statement of Principes and 1970 In-
terpretive Comments, in AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 1 (1977). The 1970
Interpretive Comments, in AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS at 3, also require at
least one year notice prior to terminating a faculty member with two or more years of
service. See note 124 infra.
111. AAUP, 1976 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and
Tenure § 8, in AAUP, PoLiCY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 15, (1977). Section 8 provides in
part: "If the appointment is terminated, the faculty member will receive salary or notice in
accordance with the following schedule:... at least oneyear, if the decision is reached
after eighteen months of probationary service or if the faculty member has tenure." Id. at
20 (emphasis added).
112. See Loebeck v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 96 Idaho 459,530 P.2d 1149 (1975). The
Idaho Supreme Court in Loebeck held Idaho State University to the plain meaning of its
notice of nonrenewal standards which were essentially a verbatim recitation of the AAUP
standards. Assimilation of the AAUP standards would have provided significant support
for the court's disposition of the case.
113. 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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not be renewed. 114 The faculty members filed suit alleging breach
of contract and seeking renewal of their appointments because
they had not received the requisite notice of nonrenewal to which
they were entitled under the university regulations.11 5 The profes-
sors also asserted that the university was required to provide the
terminated faculty members with hearings because nonrenewal
had been predicated on charges of misconduct. 1 1 6
In asserting their claims, the faculty members were confronted
with language in the Howard University Faculty Handbook which
not only established specific nonrenewal notice guidelines, but
also declared that the university would not be contractually bound
to follow the guidelines. 1 7 The faculty argued they were entitled
to the notice of nonrenewal established by the Faculty Handbook,
and the university's failure to so provide required automatic re-
newal of their appointments. 18 The district court held, "the
faculty plaintiffs were not entitled to a renewal of their appoint-
ments as a matter of law, and that the university had a legal right
to dismiss them. Complete discretion in the matter is vested in the
university authorities."' 119
114. Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D.D.C. 1967).
115. Id.
116. The relevant section of the faculty handbook provided: 'The Board of Trustees
reserves the right of dismissal, regardless of tenure, in cases of. . . personal conduct in-
compatible with the welfare of the University .... The person concerned, upon written
request, shall be given a hearing before a committee of the Board of Trustees ...
HOWARD UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK, quotedin 412 F.2d at 1132.
117. The relevant sections provided:
It will be the practice of the University, without contractual obligation to do so, to
give written notice at the following times to officers of instruction whose services
are no longer required:
A) Deans will give notice each year to those whose terms expire and whom
they do not propose to recommend for reappointment, not later than De-
cember 15 of that year,
B) The Board of Trustees will give notice to those teachers whose terms ex-
pire and whose services are no longer required, directly following its
meeting in January of each year.
HOWARD UNrwERsrrY FACULTY HANDBOOK, quotedin 412 F.2d at 1132 (emphasis added).
118. 271 F. Supp. at 614.
119. Id. at 615 (emphasis added). Although the court's holding was rational, it com-
pletely disregarded the most fundamental tenet of academic freedom-namely, that profes-
sors must be free from arbitrary threats of discharge. See note 90 supra and accompanying
text. See also Fellman, Academic Freedom-The Price is Eternal Vigilance by Professors
(I), in ON AcADEMic FREEDOM 20 (V. Earle ed. 1971). For a discussion of the nexus
between the privilege of academic freedom and the concept of tenure, see Fellman, Id. at
19.
The district court stated in dicta:
It would be intolerable for the courts to interject themselves and to require an
educational institution to hire or to maintain on its staff a professor or instructor
whom it deemed undesirable and did not wish to employ. For the courts to ia-
[Vol. 31:608
DEFINING FACULTY EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
In reversing the lower court, the appeals court took judicial
notice of the fact that the university had endorsed AAUP policy 120
and rejected the university's argument that it was not obligated
contractually to follow the notice guidelines. 121 The court inferen-
tially endorsed the AAUP notice guidelines by stating that qualifi-
cations on the university's power to terminate arise when notice of
nonreappointment fails to comply with previously established
guidelines. These qualifications cannot be negated by the univer-
sity's disclaimer that it will not be contractually obligated to ad-
here to the notice provisions." The court then observed:
Contracts are written, and are to be read, by references to the
norms of conduct and expectations founded upon them. This is
especially true of contracts in and among a community of
scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of the mar-
ketplace are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context.
The employment contracts of appellants here comprehend
as essential parts of themselves the hiring policies and practices
of the University as embodied in its employment regulations
and customs. 123
The AAUP's notice standards, as initially established in the 1940
Statement, were the source of the "norms of conduct and expecta-
tions" relied upon by the court. 124 Thus, the court, utilizing the
AAUP standards, bound Howard University to its official notice
pose such a requirement would be an interference with the operation of institu-
tions of higher learning contrary to established principles of law and to the best
traditions of education.
271 F. Supp. at 615. This statement has been reiterated with disturbing frequency, see, e.g.,
Frazier v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Hopper,
410 F.2d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1969); Schultz v. Palmberg, 317 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D. Wyo.
1970); AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 273, 322 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Super
Ct. Ch. Div. 1974). For similar statements, see Ward v. Board of Regents of Kan. State
Agricultural College, 138 F. 372 (1905); Hartigan v. Board of Regents of W. Va. Univ. 49
W. Va. 14,38 S.E. 698 (1901); Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7, 58
N.W. 1042 (1894).
120. 412 F.2d at 1133-34 n.7. See note 124 infra for the AAUP notice guidelines.
121. 412 F.2d at 1135. See note 117 supra for the text of the notice guidelines contained
in the Howard University Faculty Handbook.
122. 412 F.2d at 1135.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. The AAUP Standardsfor Notice of Nonreappoiiment relied on by the court
are as follows:
Because a probationary appointment, even though for a fixed or stated term,
carries an expectation of renewal, the faculty member should be explicitly in-
formed of a decision not to renew his appointment, in order that he may seek a
position at another college or university. Such notice should be given at an early
date, since a failure to secure another position for the ensuing academic year will
deny the faculty member the opportunity to practice his profession. The purpose
of this Statement is to set forth in detail, for the use of the academic profession,
those standards for notice of nonreappointment which the Association over a pe-
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guidelines despite the university's stated intent not to be bound
contractually. 1l-5
The Ninth Circuit explicitly endorsed the 1940 Statement as
embodying the common law of academe in Adamian v. Jacob-
sen. 2 6 A tenured assistant professor in that case allegedly used
profane language to incite a group of antiwar demonstrators into
confrontation with officials, thereby creating a danger of vio-
lence.'27 The university brought charges against the professor, al-
riod of years has actively supported and which are expressed as a general princi-
ple in the 1940 Statement of Pdncoiles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.
The Standards for Notice
Notice of nonreappointment, or of intention not to recommend reappointment
to the governing board, should be given in writing in accordance with the follow-
ing standards:
(1) Not later than March 1 of thefrst academic year ofservice, if the appoint-
ment expires at the end of that year, or, if a one-year appointment termi-
nates during an academic year, at least three months in advance of its
termination.
(2) Not later than December 15 of the second academic year of service, if
the appointment expires at the end of that year, or, if an initial two-year
appomtment terminates during an academic year, at least six months in
advance of its termination.
(3) At least twelve months before the expiriation of an appointment after
two or more years in the institution.
The Standards for Notice of Nonreappointment, in AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND RE-
PORTS 13 (1977) (emphasis supplied).
125. Shortly after Greene, the Supreme Court endorsed the position that faculty em-
ployment contracts can be interpreted in light of academic custom. In Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1971), a discharged professor argued that certain college rules
and practices created a de facto tenure program and that as a result of his length of service,
the professor acquired a "legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent
'sufficient cause."' Id. at 602-03. The court opined:
A teacher, like the respondent, who has held his position for a number of years,
might be able to show from the circumstances of this service-and from other
relevant facts--that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as
this Court has found there to be a "common law of a particular plant" that may
supplement collective-bargaining agreement, so there may be an unwritten "com-
mon law" in a particular university that certain employees shall have the
equivalent of tenure.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Thus, Perry further supports the argument that when faced with the typical academic
employment contract, the court's relevant inquiry is to determine the scope and content of
the common law in a particular university. It seems plausible that the judiciary could rely
on documents such as the 1940 Statement and other AAUP policy documents to provide
this information. Because the 1940 Statement has been accepted so widely, it would be
advantageous to both the professoriate and the American university system to defer to the
Statement as the clear explication of the customs, usages, and reasonable expectations of
those persons in the academic profession. Moreover, the establishment of concrete, com-
prehensible standards is necessary for the preservation of academic freedom. See Fellman,
supra note 119, at 20; Murphy, supra note 88, at 310. See also notes 43-47 supra and
accompanying text.
126. 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975).
127. Id. at 931.
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leging that he violated a vague section of the University Code,
proof of which would have constituted "adequate cause" for dis-
missal.' 2 Although a Faculty Senate committee recommended
Adamian's retention, the Board of Regents ordered dismissal.'
29
Adamian sued, alleging the abridgement of his first amendment
free speech and assembly rights by the university. l30 The district
court agreed with Adamian and ordered him reinstated.' 3'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that the relevant sec-
tion of the University Code 132 did not regulate the content of a
professor's speech but regulated the manner in which the expres-
sion was made. 33 Nevertheless, the court thought that the Code
language was "susceptible of interpretations which would render
it overbroad."' 34 To cure the potential overbreadth, the court
took judicial notice of the fact that the language was excerpted
almost verbatim from the 1940 Statement.135  Furthermore, the
court noted that the AAUP had issued a statement interpreting
"appropriate restraint" to refer "solely to choice of language and
128. Id. Ch. 4, § 2.3 of the University Code stated:
The faculty member is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and a repre-
sentative of the University. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he will be free
from university censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community
imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and as an educator, he knows
that the public may judge his profession and this University by his utterances. At
all times he strives to be accurate, to exercise appropriate restraint, to show re-
spect for the opinions of others, and to make every effort to indicate that he is not
a spokesman for this University.
Id. at 932.
129. Id. at 931.
130. Id.
131. 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973). It should be noted that courts do not always
adhere to the traditional rule that specific performance will not be awarded for personal
service contracts. Professor Williston has stated that "appealing factual situations may oc-
casionally induce a court to enforce a personal service contract specifically, particulary in
the absence of any substantial relationshio between theparties." 11 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 1423, at 786 (1968) (emphasis added). Accord, Jones v. Williams, 139
Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897); AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 NJ. Super. 249, 273, 322
A.2d 846, 859 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
132. See note 128 supra for the text of § 2.3 of the University Code.
133. 523 F.2d at 933.
134. Id. at 934. The court cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), for the proposition that:
[t]he desire to maintain a sedate academic environment, 'to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,' is not an
interest sufficiently compelling, however, to justify limitations on a teacher's free-
dom to express himself on political issues in vigorous, argumentative, unmea-
sured, and even distinctly unpleasant terms.. .. Only where expressive
behavior 'involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others' may it
be regulated by the state.
523 F.2d at 934.
135. Id.
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to other aspects of the manner in which a statement is made. It
does not refer to the substance of a teacher's remarks. . . . 'A vio-
lation may not lie, however, in the error or unpopularity . ... of
the ideas contained in the utterance.' ",136
The court ultimately held that the AAUP interpretive lan-
guage eliminated the potential overbreadth which gives rise to
constitutional difficulties. 37  After suggesting that the regents
might have implicitly assimilated the subsequent AAUP interpre-
tations, the court remanded the case to the district court for a de-
termination of whether the regents had in fact assimilated the
AAUP's interpretation of the University Code.' 38 If such assimi-
lation could be established, Adamian's dismissal would be
proper. 139
The above discussion suggests several conclusions regarding
the role of the 1940 Statement in employment contract disputes.
Courts know that academic employment contracts are usually
facially simple and incomplete documents, making it necessary for
the courts to assimilate ancillary materials into the agreements to
integrate the contracts. Obvious sources of such supplemental
terms and conditions are the 1940 Statement, the 1970 Interpretive
Comments, and the faculty handbook of the particular college or
university.140 AAUP policy also can provide insight, direction,
and support to courts grappling with ambiguous terms, such as
"financial exigency" and "academic freedom," in an attempt to
discern accepted customary and usual practice at the academic in-
stitution.' 4 1 Finally, AAUP policy is not a one-sided weapon to
be wielded only by the professoriate, as Adamian indicates.142
136. Id. (emphasis added). See AAUP, Committee A Statement on Extramural Utter-
ances, supra note 74. For the full text of the AAUP's extramural utterances policy, see
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 132-34 (L. Joughin ed. 1967).
137. 523 F.2d at 934-35. The court stated that it was readily apparent that the AAUP
"intended to assure a professor his full measure of first amendment rights." Id. at 935.
138. Id. at 935.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Loebeck v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 96 Idaho 459, 530 P.2d 1149 (1975).
141. One year after the Ninth Circuit issued its Adamian opinion, it heard another
teacher dismissal case. In Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976), Judge Huf-
stedler wrote that AAUP policy, "[w]hile ... not binding upon us, .. is useful." Id. at
1043.
142. The opening paragraph of the 1940 Statement supports theAdamian holding. The
paragraph states in part, "Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common
good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a
whole." AAUP, 1940 Statement afPrincioles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP,
POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 2 (1977).
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Because it is difficult to codify clear, precise, and acceptable
standards of behavior, dismissals based on conduct or speech pose
the most dangerous threat to academic freedom. If the boundaries
of protected speech and action are not demarcated clearly, aca-
demic freedom will become an empty privilege. The 1940 State-
ment and other AAUP policy documents, however, provide
clarity and substance to the typical academic employment con-
tract. Without such clarity in employment contracts, faculty
members will continue to be victimized by vague contracts and
indeterminate personnel regulations, such as those in Adamian.
B. AA UP Policies as Normative Standards
Within three months after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion
in Adamian, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided Browzin v. Catholic University of America. 43 Browzin
provides substantial support for utilizing the 1940 Statement and
other AAUP policy documents to interpret academic employment
contracts. The court's opinion suggests that AAUP policy is
designed to protect the legitimate interests of both the professori-
ate and college or university administration.
In Browzin, a tenured engineering professor was dismissed be-
cause of the university's financial condition.'" Browzin sued the
university for breach of contract, alleging that the institution
failed to make a good faith effort to find him alternative employ-
ment within the university. 14  Before trial, the parties stipulated
several issues, most notably "that Catholic University was faced
with a bonafide financial exigency. . . ." and that the 1968 Rec-
ommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and
Tenure (RIR), promulgated by the AAUP, were to provide the
governing standards."4 The relevant standard provided in perti-
nent part: "Before terminating an appointment because of the
143. 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
144. Id. at 844-45.
145. Id. at 845.
146. Id. The AAUP revised the 1968 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Aca-
demic Freedom and Tenure (RIR) in 1976, modifying the language on which the court in
Browzin relied to reflect the court's interpretation. The basic objectives of the 1976 RJR,
however, are the same as the objectives of the 1968 AIR; each seeks to provide, "in lan-
guage suitable for use by an institution of higher education rules which derivefrom the chief
provisions and interpretations of the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure and ofthe 1958 Statement of Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Pro-
ceedings." AAUP, 1976 Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, in AAUP, POLICY DocumENrs AND REmRTS 15 (1977) (emphasis supplied).
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abandonment of a program or department of instruction, the institu-
tion will make every effort to place the affectedfaculty members in
other suitable positions. '147
The district court, noting that this language made no reference
to termination caused by financial exigency, dismissed the com-
plaint, holding that the "suitable position" requirement applied
only to terminations resulting from "discontinuance of programs
or departments of instruction."' 148 The court held, therefore, that
the university was under no contractual obligation to find Browzin
another position within the institution since his dismissal had been
predicated on a bona fide financial exigency.149
Although the appellate court upheld Browzin's dismissal on
other grounds, 5 0 the court's opinion provides substantial support
for the proposition that it is proper for a court to use the Statement
and other AAUP material to interpret the employment con-
tract. 15  Browzin argued on appeal that the "suitable position"
requirement applied to dismissals for financial exigency and those
necessitated by a program or instructional department's
termination. 52
Although the court did not rule on that particular issue, it
stated that the AAUP's amicus brief cited the 1968 AIR 53 which
presented strong evidence that the "suitable position" requirement
147. 54 AAUP BULL., 448, 449 (1968), quoted in 527 F.2d at 845 (emphasis added).
The standard's language has been amended to delete any reference to "abandonment of a
program or department of instruction" and to include a clause requiring faculty participa-
tion in the search for another suitable position. The new standard states, "Before terminat-
ing an appointment because of financial exigency, the institution, with faculty
participation, will make every effort to place the faculty member concerned in another
suitable position within the institution." AAUP, 1976 RIR, in AAUP, POLICY Docu-
MENTS AND REPORTS 18 (1977).
148. 527 F.2d at 846.
149. Id.
150. The district court had made an alternative finding that if its interpretation of the
pertinent regulation were reversed, Browzin's claim should fail because he failed to show
lack of good faith effort by the university to find him an alternative position. Furthermore,
the court noted that the administration had undertaken a "'detailed review' of all pro-
grams and positions" before dismissing Browzin. Id. at 849.
151. Id. at 847-48.
152. Id. at 846.
153. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors at 11-15, quoted &
Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 527 F.2d 843, 846-48 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Of particu-
lar relevance to the court was a quote from the Operating Guidelines on Institutional
Problems Resultingfrom Financial Exigency issued by the AAUP in 1972 which provided:
"Tenured faculty members should be given every opportunity, in accordance with Regula-
tion 4(c). . .to readopt [sic] within a department or elsewhere within the institution; insti-
tutional resources should be made available for assistance in readaption." Id. at 14, quoted
in 527 F.2d at 846.
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applied to dismissals resulting both from program discontinuance
and from financial exigency.154 More importantly, the court
stated in a footnote that its use of interpretive documents such as
the 1925 and 1940 Statements and other AAUP reports "could
hardly be questioned." '155 The court further asserted that the
materials cited "form a kind of legislative history for the 1968
Regulations" since they were accepted by organizations represent-
ing both university faculty and administrators. 5 6 Judge Wright's
opinion in Browzin provides authority for the proposition that
AAUP policy statements represent a legitimate informational
source from which to establish normative standards in higher edu-
cation. As such, a court should utilize these materials when con-
fronted with a dispute based on an alleged breach of an academic
employment contract.
Krotkoff v. Goucher College"5 7 provides further judicial sup-
port for the proposition that the 1940 Statement and other AAUP
policy documents properly establish normative standards in
higher education and are appropriate sources of information to a
court interpreting an employment contract. In Krotkoff, the col-
lege dismissed a tenured professor due to financial exigency which
threatened the entire institution. Krotkoff sued alleging that
Goucher College's tenure policy, as articulated in the college
bylaws, provided that a tenured faculty member would be re-
tained until retirement or dismissal for cause.'58 Krotkoff argued
that since the bylaws made no express or implied reference to
financial exigency as grounds for termination, dismissal on that
basis constituted a breach of her employment contract.159 The
college acknowledged that the bylaws did not explicitly include
financial exigency as a permissible basis for dismissal.'6 ° The col-
lege argued, however, that the common understanding of the aca-
demic community, as embodied in the 1940 Statement, included
"the notion that a college may refuse to renew a tenured teacher's
contract because of financial exigency so long as its action is de-
154. 527 F.2d at 848.
155. 527 F.2d at 847-48 n.8 (emphasis added). Notably, Judge Wright expressed reser-
vations as to the propriety of the judicial use of AAUP guidelines and reports from AAUP
investigations into alleged violations of the 1940 Statement. Id. at 848.
156. Id. at 847-48 n.8.
157. 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
158. Id. at 678.
159. Id. at 676.
160. Id. at 678.
1981]
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monstrably bona fide."'16 1 The college's position was that the ex-
press terms of the employment contract were supplemented by the
1940 Statement. 62
After reviewing the basic policy underlying the principle of
tenure,16 3 examining the testimony of Krotkoff and Goucher
faculty members regarding their understanding of tenure con-
tracts,"6 and realizing that there was no understanding at
Goucher that tenured faculty had greater protection from
financially based dismissal than faculty at other colleges, the court
held that the Goucher employment contract must "be interpreted
consistently with the understanding of the national academic com-
munity about tenure and financial exigency."' 65 Consequently,
the court upheld Krotkoff's dismissal.
The AAUP, intervening as amicus curiae, argued that if the
college desired to assimilate the 1940 Statement into the contract,
the court should recognize that the term "financial exigency," as
employed in academia, "carries with it certain counter-balancing
[sic] obligations and constraints." 166 Furthermore, dismissal due
to financial exigency imposes an affirmative obligation on the in-
stitution to find the professor another "suitable position" within
the college. 1 67 The court did not rule expressly on this issue;
rather, it noted that the evidence supported the inference that "a
demonstrably bona fide termination includes this requirement."16 8
Notably, neither the 1940 Statement nor the 1970 Interpretive
Comments expressly impose the "suitable position" requirement
as a condition of invoking the financial exigency clause.6 9 Thus,
it is possible to construe the court's language in Krotkoff as per-
mitting invocation of the financial exigency clause through assimi-
lation of the 1940 Statement into the employment contract without
161. Id See note 59 supra.
162. 585 F.2d at 679.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 680.
165. Id. The court also quoted the language from Greene, set forth in the text accom-
panying note 123 supra, for additional support for the proposition that it was appropriate
to consider AAUP policy documents to interpret the employment contract. Id.
166. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors at 4, Krotkoff. v.
Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978), on file with the Case Western Reserve Law
Review.
167. Id. at 19-21, quoted in 585 F.2d at 682.
168. 585 F.2d at 682.
169. See note 59 supra. See AAUP, Academic Freedom and Tenure, 1940 Statement of
Principles and 1970 Interpretive Comments, in AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS
1-4 (1977). But see note 147 supra.
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imposing the correlative "suitable position" obligation developed
in subsequent AAUP interpretations of the clause.
It appears that the AAUP's work, both as an investigative
agency and as a quasi-legislative body, 170 has had a profound in-
fluence on the law of higher education.17 1 Because the academic
employment contract is generally brief and incomplete, 172 the cen-
tral issues when a breach is alleged are often those of defining and
interpreting the content of the agreement.173 The difficulty in ana-
lyzing these employment contracts lies in determining the appro-
priate sources to supply supplemental contract terms and defining
those terms in the context of the academic environment. 74 As
was observed in Greene, 75 "The readings of the market place are
not invariably apt in this non-commercial context."' 176 As a result
of this unusual "non-commercial context," strict application of
traditional contract law will yield predictable, possibly justifiable,
results; but such results will not serve adequately the needs of the
academic profession. 77
In an effort to aid in the interpretive process, courts are begin-
170. See notes 55-70 supra and accompanying text.
171. See generally Finkin, supra note 2, at 1121; Murphy, supra note 88. See also Fur-
niss, Faculty Tenure and Contract Systems: Current Practice, A.C.E. SPECIAL REPORT (July
27, 1972), quoted in Finkin, supra note 85, at 598 n.84. Dr. Furniss, surveying 413 educa-
tional institutions, states that "in the past, the policies and practices of large numbers of
institutions were inadequate or repressive. This survey indicates, however, that AAUP pol-
icies with respect to length of probationary period, credit for prior service, written reasons
for nonrenewal, and the availability of appeal procedures are widely observed ...
Furniss, supra at 2.
172. See, ag., Loebeck v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 96 Idaho 459, 462, 530 P.2d 1149,
1152 (1975) (employment contract described as "a simple printed one page document
[which does] not purport to set forth the entire contractual agreement between the
parties").
173. See notes 113-69 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 1-13 supra and accompanying text.
175. 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
176. Id. at 1135.
177. Professor Finkin argues that the absence of a prior course of dealings between the
professor and the institution, which would give rise to terms implied by law, requires that
the total agreement be viewed as limited to expressly stated terms. Finkin continues:
[Tihe law of contract, developed primarily in the commercial setting, is a machine
that churns out predictable, doctrinally mandated results such as: (1) if the insti-
tution expressly disclaims that it is legally bound by the award of tenure, the
tenure commitment becomes purely moral, rather than lega; (2) even in the ab-
sence of a disclaimer, the "promise" of tenure is a nullity for want of mutuality of
obligation or for additional consideration adequate to support a contract of possi-
bly lifetime duration; (3) the very lack of clarity in the terms of the tenure con-
tract as, for example, the salary that will be paid in the future, renders the
contract voidable for want of agreement on a material term, and so on.
Finkin, su.pra note 2, at 1125-26.
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ning to examine the major policy documents propounded by the
AAUP.178 Academic employment contracts only can be under-
stood in light of the established custom and usage of the academic
profession. 179 As one court stated: "Every trade, art and profes-
sion, has a language in some degree peculiar to itself, and it is only
by reference to the general understanding of those who are accus-
tomed to use it, that we arrive at the meaning."' 80 Although judi-
cial use of the 1940 Statement to supply ancillary terms and define
custom and usage in the profession seems to be increasing, its use
is still infrequent and the results often inconsistent.181 Declining
enrollments and increasing costs continue to plague the nation's
colleges and universities. It is predicted that the market for doc-
toral degree holders will continue to be saturated until the mid-
1990's.182 Thus, it seems plausible that faculty contract litigation
will continue and possibly increase.
While the courts began to view AAUP documents as interpre-
tive guides to faculty employment contracts, college and univer-
178. See notes 113-69 supra and accompanying text.
179. Cf. Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 680 (4th Cir. 1978) (Krotkofi's
"contract must be interpreted consistently with the understanding of the national academic
community ...."); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C Cir. 1969) (aca-
demic employment contracts must be interpreted "by reference to the norms of conduct
and expectations founded upon them").
180. H.W. Conner & Co. v. Robinson, 9 S.C.L. (2 Hill 354, 358) 197, 198 (S.C. 1834).
Accord, Perry v. Sidermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
181. The decisions discussed in notes 113-69 supra and accompanying text should not
create the impression that the 1940 Statement and subsequent AAUP policy documents
have been recognized universally as authoritative sources of ancillary contract terms, cus-
tom and usage, and normative standards in academe.
Although significant progress in this direction has been made in the federal courts, the
state court trend is less than encouraging. See, eg., Scheur v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb.
618, 260 N.W.2d 595 (1977); Baker v. Cooper Union, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1976, at 5 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1976). Additionally, some of the federal interpretations are narrow. See, eg.,
Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Others contain dis-
turbingly noncommital passages. See, e.g., Krotkoffv. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1978). See Finkin supra note 2, at 1127-41 for an excellent critique of the Baker and
Scheuer opinions. See also Fellman, supra note 119, at 17. In his article, Fellman con-
cluded with the following observation:
Academic freedom is one of America's most precious assets. Without it our col-
leges and universities cannot accomplish the indispensible purposes of higher ed-
ucation .... [C]ourts are powerful agencies of social control, and even their
inactivity may entail serious consequences. They have much to offer in the de-
fense of intellectual freedom. When American courts come to understand that
the right of teachers and students to academic freedom is a fundamental legal
right which is a much entitled to judicial protection as any other constitutional
right, then indeed, will the cause of intellectual liberty acquire a powerful and
most welcome ally.
Id. at 46.
182. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1122.
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sity faculty examined another source of judicial intervention to
secure their positions in academia---the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). Although the professoriate succeeded in its initial
attempt to organize, that success was short-lived, as evidenced by
the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University.18 3
Only with the advent of the NLRB did the true collectivization
commence. The following section describes the professoriate's
history of unionization"' and concludes with a discussion of
Yeshiva. 85
IV. THE NLRB AND THE AAUP
During the post World War II era and continuing through the
1960's, there was a great demand for academicians.1 16 Beginning
in the early 1970's, however, as a result of declining student en-
rollment, the demand for such individuals experienced a marked
decline.117 Consequently, faculty members who thought they had
been mistreated litigated their claims to protect their positions.
Not only did faculty members pursue judicial remedies with in-
creasing frequency, but they also became the beneficiaries of a
new position adopted by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).
A. The Development of NLRB Jurisdiction Over
Faculty Bargaining Units
Prior to the economic decline of the early 1970's, the NLRB
refused to extend its jurisdiction to labor disputes at private col-
leges and universities. 8' The NLRB adopted this position in 1951
183. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
184. See notes 188-237 infra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 239-87 infra and accompanying text.
186. See note 92 supra.
187. Finkin describes the institutional response to the new economic climate as follows:
On the institutional level, administrations have engaged in programs of retrench-
ment, resulting in the termination of tenured faculty; some institutions have mod-
ified their tenure policies to be less protective of the faculty than the protections
accorded by the 1940 Statement.... The labor market no longer functions as an
important constraint on administrative behavior as it did in the previous decade.
Finkin, supra note 2, at 1122.
188. The jurisdiction of the NLRB includes all "employers" and "employees" as de-
fined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) who do not meet certain specific excep-
tions, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (1976), and whose labor disputes may create a substantial
disruption of the free flow of interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 151(1). While the NLRA's
language appears to extend the NLRB's jurisdiction to any commercial activity affecting
commerce, the NLRB has refused to extend its jurisdiction to cover employers who do not
affect commerce significantly. To determine when its jurisdiction is appropriate, the
19811
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in Trustees of Columbia University.189 In Columbia, the NLRB
held that assertion of its jurisdiction over a bargaining unit' 90 con-
sisting of the university library's clerical employees would not ef-
fectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)191 which dictated the elimination of obstructions upon
interstate commerce caused by labor unrest.'92 The Board in Co-
lumbia believed that assertion of its jurisdiction was inappropriate
because "the activities involved were noncommercial in nature
and intimately connected with the charitable purposes and educa-
tional activities of the institution."'
193
The Board predicated the nonassertion of its jurisdiction over
private university employees on its analysis of the legislative his-
tory of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA. 94 The
House version of the amendments initially excluded a number of
nonprofit organizations from the definition of "employer."' 9 5 The
Senate bill, in contrast, initially failed to provide an exclusion for
NLRB has promulgated a list of minimum financial standards which must be met before
the NLRB will assert jurisdiction. See generally R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW
ch. 3, § 2 (1976).
189. 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976) provides that the NLRB will determine the scope of the
employee unit "appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining." Id. Determining
the proper scope of a bargaining unit ensures that all of the employees contained within the
unit share a community of interest. See R. GORMAN, supra note 188, ch. 5, § 2.
191. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427.
192. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Section 7 of the NLRA, which concerns the rights of
employees to form labor organizations and to bargain collectively, also asserts another pur-
pose of the Act:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
193. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427 n.98.
194. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
195. See H.R. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 33-34
(1948). The bill proposed that the following enterprises be exempted from the definition of
employer.
[A] any corporation, community chest, fund orfoundation organized and operated
exclusivelyfor religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educationalpurposes, or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of anyprivate shareholder or individual, and no substan-
tialpart of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation.
Id. at 34. (emphasis added)
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any charitable or nonprofit organizations, 196 although ultimately
the Senate did include an exemption for nonprofit hospitals. 197 As
adopted in its final form, the Labor Management Relation Act
(LMRA) of 1947 included only the Senate's limited exemption of
nonprofit hospitals. 98
The Columbia University employees argued that the limited
exemption enacted by Congress implied that extension of the
NLRB's jurisdiction to private colleges and universities was ap-
propriate.' 99 The Board rejected this argument, noting that lan-
guage in the conference report indicated that despite the failure to
enact the broad exemptions proposed by the House, assertion of
NLRB jurisdiction to any of the organizations contained in the
House version 2°° should, nevertheless, be rare.20 ' The conference
believed that the NLRB should assert jurisdiction only "in con-
nection with the purely commercial activities of such organiza-
tions."202 The Board thought that the activities of the proposed
bargaining unit were related to the charitable and educational
purposes of the university; therefore, jurisdiction was deemed to
be improper and in conflict with the purposes of the Act.20 3 The
NLRB adhered to this position, originally adopted in Columbia,
and rarely asserted its jurisdiction over private colleges and uni-
196. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 102 (1948).
197. 93 CONG. REC. S4997 (daily ed. May 12, 1947). The exemption covered "any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Id.
198. This exemption was contained in LMRA, Pub. L. No. 61-101, § 2(2), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), but it has since been deleted. See Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 1(a), 88 Stat. 395 (1974)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152).
199. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427.
200. See note 195 supra.
201. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427 (citing H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in
I NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at
536 (1948)). The Conference Report contains the following statement when explaining
why the specific exclusions for nonprofit organizations originally provided by the House
version of the bill were not included in the final draft of the bill.
The conference agreement... follows the Senate amendment in the matter of
exclusion of nonprofit corporations and associations operating hospitals. The
other nonprofit organizations excluded under the House bill are not specifically
excluded in the conference agreement, for "only in exceptional circumstances and
in connection withpurely commercial activities of such organizations have any of the
activities of such organizations or of their employees been considered as affecting
commerce so as to bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations
Act."
Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
versities during the ensuing two decades.2°
As the academic profession entered a period of economic de-
cline in the early 1970's, the NLRB decided Cornell University.2 °5
In Cornell, the Board reconsidered the issue of whether a univer-
sity's commercial activities had a significant enough impact on in-
terstate commerce to warrant the assertion of NLRB jurisdiction.
The Board, after noting the size and scope of operations of the
modem university, observed that Cornell had approximately
5,700 nonacademic employees throughout the state.2 °6 The Board
also determined that Cornell's interstate commerce activities were
substantial and held that assertion of jurisdiction was proper and
necessary "to insure the orderly, effective, and uniform applica-
tion of the national labor policy. '2°7 As a result of Cornell, pri-
vate nonprofit educational institutions were considered to be
"employers" as defined by the NLRA.2 °8 It is notable, however,
that the bargaining unit sanctioned in Cornell was limited to din-
ing hall employees and, more importantly, specifically excluded
all academic and professional employees.20 9 Shortly after the Cor-
nell decision, the Board promulgated an official jurisdictional
standard stating that NLRB jurisdiction could be asserted over
any proceeding involving a private nonprofit college or university
whose gross annual revenues exceeded one million dollars.210
The NLRB initially considered the specific issue of faculty
unionization in 1971 in C W. Post Center of Long Island Univer-
sity.21 ' The university, attempting to resist the extension of
NLRB jurisdiction over a proposed faculty bargaining unit, ar-
gued that the NLRB's jurisdiction was improper because the
204. For specific cases where the NLRB denied jurisdiction because the relevant activi-
ties generally were involved in the commercial aspects of the college or university, see 97
N.L.R.B. at 425 n.3.
205. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
206. Id. at 330.
207. Id. at 334. The Board prefaced the above quoted statement with the observation
that "it is no longer sufficient to say that merely because employees are in a nonprofit sector
of the economy, the operations of their employers do not substantially affect interstate
commerce." Id. at 333.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
209. 183 N.L.R.B. at 336.
210. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1980) provides:
The Board will assert its jurisdiction in any proceeding arising under sections 8, 9,
and 10 of the Act involving any private nonprofit college or university which has
a gross annual revenue from all sources (excluding only contributions which, be-
cause of limitation by the grantor, are not available for use for operating ex-
penses) of not less than $1 million.
211. 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
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faculty functioned in a managerial and supervisory capacity, and,
as such, the faculty was excluded from coverage under the
NLRA's "supervisor" exemption.2"2 In response, the Board noted
the significant scope of the C.W. Post faculty's traditional power
to formulate and propound policy213 but observed that the Board
of Trustees was vested with the final authority to take any
action.21 4
Furthermore, the Board noted that in exercising its duties and
responsibilities, the faculty acted "on the basis of collective discus-
sion and consensus."2 5 The Board, however, did not elaborate on
the relevance of this collegial or quasi-collegial authority struc-
ture.21 6 In conclusion, the Board rejected the university's argu-
ment, stating that "the policymaking and quasi-supervisory
authority which adheres to fultime faculty status but is exercised
by them only as a group does not make them supervisors within
the meaning of § 2(11) . . . or managerial employees ... 217
Thus, the faculty's exercise of "managerial and supervisory au-
thority" on a collective basis was deemed sufficient justification to
override the supervisory and managerial statutory exceptions and
212. The NLRA specifically excludes "any individual employed as a supervisor" from
the statutory definition of an employee. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The Act defines "super-
visor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, sus-
pend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employ-
ees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectivel to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such au-
thority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independ-
ent judgment.
Id. § 152(11) (emphasis added). The NLRA neither specifically defines managerial em-
ployees, nor explicitly excludes them from the NLRA's coverage. The Board, however, has
defined managerial employees as "executives who formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer." Palace
Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947). The exclusion of manage-
rial employees from the NLRA's coverage was established judicially in NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 286-90 (1974).
213. The faculty traditionally formulated policy regarding student admission, curricu-
lum and graduation requirements, along with rules for grading and honor assignments.
The faculty also exercised power in the areas of faculty appointment, reappointment, ten-
ure, and dismissal. 189 N.L.R.B. at 905.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Such an authority structure is typical in most universities. The Board expanded
on the relevance of the concept of collegial authority in a subsequent opinion, Adelphi
Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972), where it stated that-a true collegial authority system envi-
sions all "power and authority [being] vested in a body composed of all one's peers or
colleagues . . . ." Id. at 648. See text accompanying notes 218-25 infra.
217. 189 N.L.R.B. at 905.
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permit the extension of NLRB jurisdiction to faculties at private
colleges and universities.
The NLRB rendered two additional decisions after C W. Post
Center establishing further justification for the inclusion of pri-
vate college and university faculties within the jurisdictional scope
of the NLRB. InAde#?hi University,218 the university administra-
tion attempted to exclude fourteen faculty who were members of
the personnel and grievance committees from the bargaining
unit.2 19 Despite the fact that the Board agreed with the univer-
sity's contention that the faculty exercised supervisory author-
ity,220 it determined that assertion of its jurisdiction was proper.22 1
The Board's basis for asserting its jurisdiction in Adeiphi was
built upon the C W. Post Center rationale that faculty members
cannot be classified as supervisory or managerial employees when
their authority is exercised collectively. 222 The Board opined that
a true collegial authority system simply would fail to provide a
rational basis for the supervisory exclusion in the NLRA, and
thus, by definition, faculty members engaging in collective deci-
sionmaking could not be supervisors.223 The difficulty, according
to the Board, was that neither the faculty acting collectively in
C W. Post Center or the faculty acting by committee in 4dephi
"quite fit the mold of true collegiality," nor did they "fit the tradi-
tional role of 'supervisor' as that term is thought of in the commer-
cial world or as it has been interpreted under our Act." 2 4 The
Board asserted, however, that the collegial principle is to be "rec-
ognized and given some effect."2 25
As additional support for its conclusion that faculty unions
were covered by the NLRA, the Board specifically held that the
faculty committee's lack of final authority was also sufficient to
218. 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
219. Id at 639.
220. Id. When discussing the personnel committee the Board observed, 'The function
of the committee is to pass on all matters of tenure, hiring or promotions to associate or full
professor, granting sabbatical or honorary leaves-of-absence, and suspending or terminat-
ing full-time faculty members during the term of their contracts." Id. at 647.
221. Id. at 648.
222. Id.
223. Id See note 212 supra.
224. 195 N.L.R.B. at 648. The Board noted that the problem with transplanting the
NLRA from the industrial sphere to the academic sphere was due to the existence of the
concept of collegial authority in academia. The NLRA was designed to deal with tradi-
tional hierarchial authority structures which are endemic to the commercial world. Id.
225. Id. (emphasis supplied).
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override the supervisory and managerial exceptions.226 Thus, the
members of the committees engaging in collective decisionmaking
and lacking "ultimate authority" were included properly within
the bargaining unit.227
In University of Miami,- 8 the NLRB proposed a third justifi-
cation for the assertion of its jurisdiction to cover faculty bargain-
ing units at private colleges and universities: Faculty members
cannot be characterized as supervisors because faculties act in
their own interests rather than in the interest of the university.229
In Miami, the university advanced arguments regarding the man-
agerial and supervisory role of the faculty similar to those asserted
in C. W. Post Center and Adelphi.2 0 The Board summarily dis-
missed the university's arguments regarding the status of the
faculty as supervisors and managers and then reaffirmed support
for the two previously established justifications: collective ac-
tion231 and lack of final authority. 3 The Board, citing section
2(11) of the NLRA, 3 3 held that faculty members could not be
characterized as supervisors because they acted in their own inter-
ests rather than in the interest of the university. 34 Thus, despite
the absence of precedence for its holding, the Board chose to up-
hold the rulings of the Hearing Officer by straightforwardly apply-
ing the definition of "supervisor" which requires the employee to
exercise authority "in the interest of the employer."'235
The crucial aspect of the C W. Post Center, Adeiphi, and
Miami decisions was their timing. As institutional support for the
1940 Statement eroded, 36 faculty members had an opportunity to
bolster their positions through collective action. The benefits and
uniform standards once secured by the 1940 Statement now could
be embodied in the labor agreement negotiated through the col-
lective bargaining process. This benefit was ephemeral, however,
as NLRB jurisdiction was shortlived. 37
226. Id See note 212 supra.
227. 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
228. 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
229. Id.
230. Id. For the administration's arguments, see text accompanying notes 212 and 220
supra.
231. C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
232. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
233. See note 218 su.pra for the text of§ 2(11).
234. 213 N.L.R.B. at 634.
235. See note 212 supra.
236. See note 187 supra.
237. For a general discussion of collective bargaining in a university setting, see Fen-
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B. Yeshiva
NLRB jurisdiction over the faculty of private colleges and uni-
versities was revoked in 1980 when the Supreme Court decided
NLAB v. Yeshiva University. 3  The Yeshiva Faculty Association
sought NLRB certification as the official bargaining unit for full-
time faculty at Yeshiva.239 The university opposed the certifica-
tion, arguing that the faculty functioned in a managerial or super-
visory capacity.2- ° Following its well-established precedent,' 4 the
NLRB rejected the university's arguments and held that the
faculty members were professional employees entitled to the bene-
fits of the NLRA.' 42
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed the appeals
court decision, which had reversed the NLRB, 243 and held that
full-time faculty of Yeshiva were managerial employees and ex-
cluded from NLRA coverage.'" Justice Powell began the major-
ton, Universiy Faculty and the Institution of Collective Bargaining, 69 Ky. L.J. 37 (1980-81).
See generally Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 608 (1974). For a
critique of the three justifications propounded by the NLRB in support of its assertion of
jurisdiction over the faculties of private colleges and universities and an analysis of the
Second Circuit's opinion in Yeshiva, see Note, Labor Law-Full-Time Faculty Held Not to
be "Employees" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 437 (1978).
238. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
239. Id. at 674-75.
240. Id. at 675. Evidence was presented at the hearing before the NLRB that a central
administrative hierarchy served all thirteen of the individual schools comprising Yeshiva
University. The Board of Trustees had final authority in all matters. The university presi-
dent, assisted by four vice presidents, headed the administrative hierarchy. There was also
an Executive Committee, comprised of various deans and other administrators, which
made "recommendations to the President on a wide variety of matters." University-wide
policies establishing guidelines for teaching loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retire-
ment and fringe benefits were formulated by the central administration and approved by
the Board of Trustees. Furthermore, the dean of each school formulated that school's op-
erating budget which was subject to approval by the university president "after consulta-
tion with a committee of administrators." Id See notes 257 and 259 infra for a discussion
of the scope of the faculty's authority.
241. University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Adelphia Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639
(1972); C.W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
242. 444 U.S. at 678 (citing 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975)). After the election and
certification of the union, the university refused to bargain. The Board ordered the univer-
sity to bargain and sought enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Although the Second Circuit agreed that the faculty members were professional employees
under § 2(12) of the NLRA, it nevertheless denied enforcement of the Board's order. Not-
ing the "extensive control" that Yeshiva's faculty had over both academic and personnel
matters and the faculty's "crucial role . . . in determining other central policies of the
institution," the Second Circuit held that the faculty members were characterized properly
as managerial employees. Id. at 679 (citing 528 F.2d 686, 698 (1978)).
243. 582 F.2d 686, 698 (1978).
244. 444 U.S. at 679.
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ity opinion by noting that the legislative history of the NLRA 245
revealed Congress' belief that colleges and universities, because of
their nonprofit nature, were not covered by the NLRA.246 Justice
Powell then discussed the precedent justifying the assertion of
NLRB jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions.247 The
majority, however, summarily dismissed the jurisdictional rules
established in C. W. Post Center and Adeiphi as "flatly inconsistent
with its [NLRB] precedent... ,,,248 indicating that the only argu-
ment supporting NLRB jurisdiction was that faculty, as profes-
sional employees, acted in their own interests rather than in the
interests of the university.24 9
The Court, however, noted that professional employees may
be excluded properly from NLRA coverage if they can be charac-
terized as "managerial employees."'-5" Previously, the Supreme
Court had defined "managerial employees" as those who "formu-
late and effectuate management policies by expressing and mak-
ing operative the decisions of their employer."251 The Court
noted that prior to Yeshiva the NLRB applied the managerial ex-
clusion to an employee who "represents management interests by
taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively con-
trol or implement employer policy." '252 In Yeshiva, the NLRB
shifted its focus to determine whether the interests of the faculty
were aligned sufficiently with the interests of management.2 53 The
Court criticized this "alignment with management" criterion as
being a wholly new jurisdictional theory without support in prior
Board opinions. 54
In reality, however, the "alignment with management" crite-
rion was only a refinement of the University of Miami
rule-namely, the NLRB jurisdiction was proper when the faculty
245. See notes 195-204 supra and accompanying text.
246. 444 U.S. at 679-80. Justice Powell cited "S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess., 7
(1935) (dispute between employer and college professor would not be covered); H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947) (listing professional employees covered by
new statutory provision without mentioning teachers); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess., 11, 19 (1947) (same)." Id. at 680 n.9.
247. Id. at 681.
248. 444 U.S. at 685.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 682.
251. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 268 (1974) (quoting Palace Laundry
Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320,323 n.4 (1947)). For a discussion of Bell and Palace,
see note 218 supra.
252. 444 U.S. at 683.
253. Id. at 684.
254. Id. at 685. See text accompanying notes 233-35 supra.
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exercises authority in its own interest rather than in the interest of
the university.255 Accordingly, the NLRB argued that because
faculty members were not "expected to conform to management
policies [nor] judged according to their effectiveness in carrying
out those policies," the interests of management and faculty were
insufficiently aligned, and therefore, the faculty could not be con-
sidered managerial employees.256 Furthermore, the NLRB ar-
gued that classifying faculty as managerial employees was
improper because the faculty, when involved in academic govern-
ance, was expected to exercise "independent professional
judgment. 257
The Court rejected the NLRB's argument that the faculty's in-
terests were aligned insufficiently with the interests of the institu-
tion to warrant a finding that the faculty members were
managerial employees.258 Instead, the Court asserted that the
Yeshiva faculty's authority must be characterized as manage-
rial.259 Justice Powell also noted that the NLRB routinely ex-
cluded professionals occupying executive positions in a
commercial setting without any inquiry into "whether their deci-
sions were based on management policy rather than professional
expertise. ' 260 Furthermore, the Court noted that permitting the
Board to apply an "independent professional judgment" test in
industrial situations could lead to the recharacterization of current
supervisory and managerial professionals as covered employ-
ees. 26 1 Finally, the Court concluded that acceptance of the "in-
dependent professional judgment" criterion implied that the
255. See text accompanying notes 229-35 supra.
256. 444 U.S. at 684.
257. Id. When discussing the respective roles of the administration and the faculty, the
Court observed that the faculty of each of the university's component schools "effectively
determine[s] its curriculum, grading system, admission and matriculation standards, aca-
demic calendars, and course schedules." Id. at 676. The central administration solicited
the faculty's recommendations in all "non-academic" matters such as faculty hiring, ten-
ure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. Id. at 677. The Court noted further that
"some faculties make final decisions regarding the admission, expulsion, and graduation of
individual students. Others have decided questions involving teaching loads, student ab-
sence policies, tuition and enrollment levels, and in one case the location of a school." Id.
258. Id. at 686.
259. Id. Justice Powell noted that the faculty's "authority in academic matters is abso-
lute." Id. When describing the specific instances of the faculty's exercise of authority Jus-
tice Powell stated, "They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled,
and to whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading
policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will be ad-
mitted, retained, and graduated." Id.
260. Id. at 687.
261. Id.
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interests of the faculty were distinct and separable from the inter-
ests of the institution and that the faculty could not be aligned
with its own interests and institutional concerns simultaneously. 262
The Court summarily rejected this distinction.263
The majority's position-that institutional and faculty inter-
ests are indistinguishable-is fundamentally flawed. The central
problem with the majority opinion, as the dissent observes, is that
"the notion that a faculty member's professional competence
could depend on his undivided loyalty to management is antitheti-
cal to the whole concept of academicfreedom.' ' 2 4
The structure of the modem college or university is no longer
accurately characterized as a collegial institution,265 as the major-
ity suggests. Colleges and universities are now "big business"
with their financial and operating activities controlled by the ad-
ministration.266 Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, noted the
majority's failure to comprehend the authority structure of the
modem educational institution. The dissent asserted that the ma-
jority opinion misconstrued the role of the faculty in the "mature"
university where there are typically two distinct lines of author-
ity.267 The first and primary line of authority is administrative,
with ultimate authority vested in the Board of Trustees.268 The
262. Id. at 688.
263. The Court concluded:
In fact, the faculty's professional interests--as applied to governance at a univer-
sity like Yeshiva-cannot be separated from those of the institution.
The "business" of a university is education, and its vitality ultimately must
depend on academic policies that largely are formulated and generally are imple-
mented by faculty governance decisions. . . . Faculty members enhance their
own standing and fulfill their professional mission by ensuring that the univer-
sity's objectives are met. . .. T]he quest for academic excellence and institu-
tional distinction is a "policy" to which the administration expects the faculty to
adhere, whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional goal.
Id.
264. Id. at 700 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See note 23 supra and ac-
companying text.
265. Finkin, supra note 237, at 615. For a comparison of the elements of a "true"
collegial form of government with the elements of a bureaucratic form, see F. KERMER & J.
BALDRIDGE, UNIONS ON CAMPUS 14-16 (1975). Kermer and Baldridge concede that "the
collegial model is a value-laden conception of how higher education organizations should
function. It seems less descriptive of what actually happens and more instructive of how
decision making should be conducted." Id. at 15. The authors observe that the bureau-
cratic model is a more realistic reflection of reality in the modem university. Id.
266. See Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), Petitioner Fordham Law School
Bargaining Committee Exhibit 8, Transcript at 600-601 for statement of President of the
University, quotedin Finkin, supro note 237, at 616.
267. 444 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Finkin, supra note 237, at 615.
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Board of Trustees then delegates authority to conduct the daily
activities involved in the ongoing university business to lower offi-
cials, such as vice presidents and deans. This structuring of au-
thority is similar to the industrial setting.269 There is also a
"parallel professional network, in which formal mechanisms have
been created to bring the expertise of the faculty into the decision-
making process."27 Justice Brennan correctly argued that the
majority failed to comprehend that any influence or decisionmak-
ing authority attributable to the faculty is a result, not of any man-
agerial prerogatives, but rather, of their "collective expertise as
professional educators."27
The faculty in the "mature" college or university is given an
advisory role; its recommendations serve the faculty's professional
interest both in creating and maintaining an environment condu-
cive to a rewarding learning experience and in ensuring that its
other professional goals will be represented.272 The fact that the
administration often may agree with faculty recommendations
cannot be interpreted as evidence of a unity of faculty-administra-
tion interests; rather, the administration often defers to faculty
recommendations that are within the faculty's area of professional
competence.273
The relevant inquiry in determining whether an employee is
characterized as "managerial" is reflected in the interest alignment
analysis.274 This analysis requires a determination of whether the
employee's actions are "undertaken for the purpose of implement-
ing the employer's policies" 275 or whether "the employee is acting
269. J. BALDRIDGE, POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY 144 (1971).
270. 444 U.S. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing J. BALDRIDGE, supra note 269, at
114; Finkin, supra note 237, at 614-18).
271. 444 U.S. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See A. THOMSON, supra note 11, at 4.
272. J. BALDRIDGE, supra note 269, at 114.
273. See generally A. THOMSON, supra note 11, at 4. Justice Brennan observed, how-
ever, that the administration
must and does apply its own distinct perspective to these recommendations, a
perspective that is based on fiscal and other managerial policies which the faculty
has no part in developing. The University always retains the ultimate decision-mak-
ing authori ... and the administration gives what weight and import to the
faculty's collective judgment as it chooses and deems consistent with its own per-
ception of the institution's needs and objectives.
444 U.S. at 697-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See J. BALDRIDGE, supra
note 269, at 114; Finkin, supra note 248, at 615.
274. Finkin, supra note 237, at 614-15. Finkin asserts that there are two related tests:
the interest alignment test and an independent professional judgment test. See University
of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.1.B. 641, 643 (1973); Adelphi
Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972).
275. 444 U.S. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 31:608
DEFINING FACULTY EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
only on his own behalf and in his own interest."2 76 If the former
condition exists, then the employee is "managerial" and excluded
from the Act's coverage; if the latter condition exists, then inclu-
sion under the Act is appropriate.277
Despite their different perceptions of the faculty's role in the
administration of modem colleges and universities, the dissent
and majority seem to agree that to be deemed "managerial," the
employee must act on behalf of, and be answerable to, the em-
ployer.2 78 The majority and dissent differ, however, in their appli-
cation of the standard to academia.
As evidence of the faculty's pervasive managerial influence,
the majority cited both the Yeshiva faculty's role in determining
the curriculum, grading system, admission criteria, matriculation
standards, academic calendars and course schedules, and also the
administration's habitual acquiescence in faculty recommenda-
tions. 279 The dissent argued, however, that the conclusion that the
interests of the faculty and administration are aligned sufficiently
does not necessarily follow from a coincidence on certain is-
sues.280 Rather, the "managerial" employee must be shown to be
a 'true representative of management'. A true management repre-
sentative is defined by the dissent as an employee who is "ex-
pected to conform to management policies and is judged by his
276. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Compare 444 U.S. at 683 (An employee is managerial "if he represents manage-
ment interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or
implement employer policy.") with 444 U.S. 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (A managerial
employee "is acting on behalf of management and is answerable to a higher authority in
the exercise of his responsibilities.").
279. 444 U.S. at 676. It is notable that many of the examples of the faculty's manage-
rial authority cited by the majority were connected intimately with the educational, as dis-
tinguished from the business, aspects of the institution. See notes 257 & 259 supra.
280. 444 U.S. at 700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan observed out that the
right to collective bargaining never has been predicated on a determination that em-
ployee-employer interests are diametrically opposed. Furthermore, unity of interest on
certain issues never has been grounds for forfeiture of the collective bargaining right. Jus-
tice Brennan noted further.
Ultimately, the performance of an employee's duties will always further the inter-
est of the employer, for in no institution do the interests of labor and management
totally diverge. Both desire to maintain stable and profitable operations. ...
Differences of opinion and emphasis may develop, however, on exactly how to
devote the institution's resources to achieve [its] goals. When these disagreements
surface, the national labor laws contemplate their resolution through the peaceful
process of collective bargaining. And in this regard, Yeshiva. . .stands on the
same footing as any other employer.
Id. at 701.
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effectiveness in executing those policies .... ."8, The dissent
noted that neither the Yeshiva faculty collectively, nor its mem-
bers individually, were accountable to the administration when
acting in a governance capacity. 22 Finally, the dissent empha-
sized that unlike managers in an industrial setting, faculty mem-
bers are not hired to implement administrative policy;28 3 rather,
they are hired to teach. Thus, the majority's classification of
professors as managers because of a mere coincidence of interest
on academic issues was erroneous.2 8 4
The majority's withdrawal of NLRB jurisdiction was untimely
because many educational institutions are facing severe financial
problems.2"5 Additionally, the nation's faculties are being pres-
sured into becoming more responsive to a number of disparate
groups, such as alumni, legislators, administrators and students.28 6
The majority, by concluding that faculty members are "manage-
rial" and thus are to be denied the benefits and protections of the
NLRA, has subjected the faculties to the repressive influence of
outside pressures.28 7
As the threat of such outside pressure increases, the need for
defenses against the demands of special interest groups also
grows. The most notable defenses are the tradition of academic
freedom and the institution of tenure.2 88 It must be remembered,
however, that academic freedom is a privilege with a limited
scope289 and tenure permits dismissal for cause.290 If these de-
fenses are not defined explicitly in the terms of the employment
contract, their usefulness will decrease, particularly in an adverse
economic climate and "tight" academic job market.2 9'
281. Id. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Sutter Community
Hosp. of Sacramento, 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385
(1975); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974).
282. 444 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Finkin, supra note 237, at 618.
283. 444 U.S. at 699-700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284. See text accompanying note 264 supra.
285. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1122-23.
286. J. GARBAP.NO, FACULTY BARGAINING 13 (1975). Garbarino notes that alumni
and legislatures often believe that faculties are not ministering properly to their primary
obfigation--teaching students. Instead, these groups often believe that faculty members
are "directing their energies to the conduct of often dubious research projects, the cultiva-
tion of exotic special topics, and the cultivation of graduate student disciplines." Id.
287. For examples of such outside pressure, see notes 36-47 supra and accompanying
text.
288. J. GARBARINO, supra note 286, at 13-14.
289. See notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text.
290. See Fellman, supra note 119, at 20-21.
291. See A. THOMSON, supra note 11, at 9.
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The two most promising methods of providing the necessary
clarity and completeness to the employment contract, however,
seem to have been lost. Institutional support for the 1940 State-
ment has eroded due to severe budgetary restrictions.292 More-
over, embodying the fundamental terms of the employment
relationship in a collective bargaining agreement, possibly predi-
cated on the 1940 Statement, seems unlikely after Yeshiva. The
future of college and university faculties as independent scholars,
therefore, depends on the professoriate's ability to institutionalize
concepts of academic freedom and tenure.
V. AFTER YESHIVA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Although courts are using the 1940 Statement to explicate am-
biguous contract terms with increasing frequency, the results of
these cases are inconsistent.293 Thus, a faculty member embroiled
in an employment contract dispute would be justified in viewing
litigation as an unpromising avenue for the vindication of the
claim.
One reason for the present inconsistency in judicial opinions is
that the principle of academic freedom, which usually pervades
faculty contract litigation, cannot be categorized easily or assigned
to a developed area of law.294 The concept of academic freedom
is:
tightly bound up with special needs, problems and expectations
of the teaching profession. A judge who does not understand
these needs, problems, and expectations is not likely to be very
helpful in dealing with a case in which academic freedom is the
central issue .... [H]e may do more harm than good, simply
because he does not understand the nature of the academic
life.
2 9 5
Faced with inconsistent judicial interpretations of academic
freedom, college and university faculties must find a means of
providing security for the members of the professoriate while
making the rights and obligations of both the individual faculty
member and the employing institution more comprehensible.
One possible solution is to draft faculty employment contracts as
completely and accurately as other similar legal documents.296
292. See Finkin, supra note 2, at 1122.
293. See note 181 supra.
294. Fellman, supra note 119, at 19.
295. Id.
296. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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Faculty employment contracts, however, are inherently different
from other types of employment contracts because they must in-
corporate ambiguous principles, such as academic freedom and
tenure, and thus, are not readily susceptible to detailed and accu-
rate particularization.2 97 Nevertheless, the customary academic
employment contract would be improved substantially through
more comprehensive drafting.
If, for example, the institution's faculty handbook is to be in-
corporated into the employment agreement, the contract should
expressly incorporate that source. Moreover, additional "funda-
mental" considerations, such as the terms of the tenure policy,
length of the probationary period, notice provisions for the re-
newal and nonrenewal of contract, and standards establishing the
dismissal procedure for tenured and nontenured professors should
be identified clearly. Adoption of such policies and procedures
would contribute greatly to reducing litigation.
In interpreting faculty employment contracts, courts often
must determine which ancillary sources should be assimilated into
the contract.298 Once the court makes this determination, it sim-
ply applies the adopted standard to the facts involved in the case.
If the relevant policies and procedures were established clearly at
the outset, there would be less need for a judicial resolution of the
dispute. A college or university academic tribunal could displace
judicial interference in contractual disputes, as it could readily ap-
ply a clear standard of conduct to a given set of facts. Thus, the
parties' respective rights and obligations would be established
clearly and resort to a judicially imposed solution would be
infrequent.
A second possible method of providing security for the profes-
soriate and defining ambiguous terms inherent in the college or
university employment relationship would be to use the AAUP as
a formal arbitration agency. The AAUP has been instrumental in
developing the 1940 Statement. As a result, some courts today
view the Statement as a codification of accepted custom and usage
in higher education. 299 Assuming that the 1940 Statement sets the
standard, it seems that the AAUP would be the best source for the
Statement's interpretation and application. One rather significant
drawback to this approach, however, is that as faculty contract
297. See notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text.
298. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
299. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1150-51. See note 171 supra for further evidence on the
acceptance of AAUP standards.
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litigation has increased, the AAUP has been perceived as a profes-
sorial organization dedicated to supporting the aggrieved profes-
sor.3" Regardless of the lack of justification for this belief, if a
college or university administration believes that it wil not receive
an impartial hearing, it will never consent to allow the AAUP to
mediate.
Professor Finkin301 recently has advanced an innovative pro-
posal designed to allay the university administration's fears that it
would not receive impartial treatment in AAUP arbitrated dis-
putes. Under this proposal, a commission comprised of an equal
number of faculty and administrative representatives would be es-
tablished. This commission would assume the role presently filled
by Committee A of the AAUP30 2 which entails the "processing of
complaints, mediation of disputes, appointment of committees of
investigation, adoption of guidelines refining the 1940 Statement,
. . . and the like. ' 303 The results of the commission's work would
be published in the AAUP Bulletin. Finally, the commission
would not impose censure, as the AAUP presently does, nor any
other direct sanction.3 4
Professor Finkin hopes that the immediate benefit of the pro-
posal would be a halt to the erosion of institutional support for the
1940 Statement which occurred during the last decade.30 5 The
proposed commission, however, would result in an even greater
benefit; its representative composition would make it difficult for a
court involved in academic litigation to ignore any decisions or
guidelines which the commission might propound.3° As the pro-
posal's advocate has stated: "[T]he courts might be expected to
defer more readily to the interpretive opinions of such an in-
dependent, bipartite body. ' 30 7 To create such a bipartite group,
the commission's future membership would be comprised of indi-
300. See Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 527 F.2d 843, 847-48 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1975). See also Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 60, at 1109-12.
301. Professor Finkin is currently a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan.
Finkin served as General Counsel of the AAUP for the 1976-78 term. Finkin also au-
thored the amicus briefs, notes 153, 166 & 167 supra, and numerous additional articles used
extensively in the preparation of this Note. The proposal is outlined in Finkin, supra note
2, at 1192-96.
302. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1193.
303. Id.
304. Id. The commission's funding is to be apportioned half to the AAUP, with the
balance to be allocated pro rata among participating institutional organizations.
305. Id at 1194. See note 181 supra.
306. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1194.
307. Id.
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viduals, "jointly designated by the participating faculty and ad-
ministrative organizations. ' 3°8  This requirement would ensure
that the commission would not assume the appearance, and possi-
bly the role, of an intra-institutional collective bargaining commit-
tee comprised solely of zealous representatives of the "opposing"
constituency.30 9
Professor Finkin's proposal is innovative and well-founded.
The only drawback to the proposal is that it may be difficult, given
the present atmosphere in academia, to achieve such cooperation
and support.31 ° It might be advisable, therefore, to attempt sev-
eral "half-way measures" as stepping stones in the implementa-
tion of Professor Finkin's proposal. First, a committee of the
American Association of Colleges (AAC) should meet with a
group of AAUP members to resolve differences on the AAUP
statements and interpretive comments which the AAC has yet to
endorse.31' Second, after both groups have agreed on these fun-
damental documents, the groups should issue a joint statement of
standards similar to the 1976 Recommended Institutional Regula-
tion on Academic Freedom and Tenure.312
An intra-institutional agreement on a set of operative regula-
tions would establish the basis for a joint standing commission
such as that envisioned by Professor Finkin. Perhaps the commis-
sion initially should be comprised of members selected by the
AAUP and the AAC collectively. Gradually, the commission
could assume the role of Committee A, placing initial emphasis on
mediation and dispute resolution. After the commission func-
tioned successfully, there might be enhanced interest in expanding
its organizational base. At that point, the commission could as-
sume the structure and role proposed by Professor Finkin which
has been characterized as "a private analogue to. . . [a] govern-
mental regulatory agency. 313
308. Id. at 1195.
309. Id. As Professor Finkin observes, under the proposed system "it is more likely
than not that the parties will tend to agree on persons of professional eminence and broad
experiene, ... whose quality of mind will tend to contribute to the Commission as [a]
collegial body, despite the difference in perspective .... I d.
310. See generally J. GAR"ARINO, supra note 286, at 1-21.
311. The most notable of these unendorsed documents are the 1970 Interpretive Com-
ments to the 1940 Statement and the Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of
Faculty.4ppointments. Furniss, supra note 79, at 17 (1978).
312. See note 146 supra.
313. Finkin, supra note 2, at 1192.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The 1940 Statement has become a normative standard gov-
erning the fundamental principles of academic freedom.3 1 4 The
current economic environment of budgetary cutbacks and con-
comitant staff reductions, however, has eroded the principles on
which the 1940 Statement was founded and has chilled the exer-
cise of academic freedom.3" 5 Intra-institutional cooperation be-
tween the AAUP and organizations representing various
administrative interests, most notably the AAC, provides the best
solution to the current problems. Most likely, there will be a con-
tinuing period of painful readjustment to compensate for the over-
expansion of the 1950's and 1960's. This readjustment, however,
must not be at the expense of academic freedom because such
freedom attracts capable individuals to the academic sphere.
Chief Justice Warren clearly recognized the importance of aca-
demic freedom when he admonished:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underesti-
mate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation.... Scholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise
our civilization will stagnate and die.3 1 6
RICHARD H. MILLER
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AAUP standards.
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